Even worse, old Joe won't ask questions, he'll be looking for someone to blame.

True Han. But the other "fact" Joe hears is that there's a gazillion bbls of oil in the XYZ formation. We can distinguish which facts are reasonable. Joe can't. And each off us will walk away bitter after we fail to convince Joe of the real facts.

I work in the oil patch. I've had such chats with the blue collar Joes I've worked with. They are truly clueless for the most part. And they think they understand oil/NG exploration/production because they draw a paycheck from an oil company.

pocampo -- A thought: you might want to read "The Black Swan". The title refers to the inability to predict very impactful events in our future. But it really delves into predicting trends in general. I'm re-reading as I'm not very good at absorbing such matters. One point that's really beginning to sink in: we might not be able to predict Black Swans such as the meltdown of the real estate biz but that doesn't mean you can't adjust your positions to lesson the impact when one hits. Maybe you pass on a few good looking deals. maybe cut your margin a little. Maybe your comtemporaries might look down on your "pessimism" but consider how you might be looking down on them today had you been in a better protected position. It's a heavy and challenging read but well worth it IMO.

In my experience, the universe is going to do all kinds of crazy things; you can describe them with math but that doesn't mean your description is what's happening.

You have that absolutely right. The Verhulst equation leading to the Logistic and Hubbert Linearization is a perfect example of that perversion. The Verhulst as applied to oil depletion is what is called a pure heuristic that explains absolutely nothing from a fundamental point-of-view. Yet it is placed on Wikipedia as "the truth". Not to say that the Logistic does not match the empirical observations, it just doesn't explain mathematically what is happening. You will often see this under the category of mathematical degeneracies, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Degeneracy_%28mathematics%29. In some ways using the Verhulst is akin to flipping a two-headed coin. It is simply a mathematical identity that does not tell you anything. It only tells you that it comes up heads, because it comes up heads. In other words, it won't make sense to you no matter how hard you try, because it wasn't put there to make sense, only because it fits the data .. occasionally. Does that make sense?

You will go far if you continue to question what you are taught, as that leads one down the road of enlightenment.

Check out Project Tuva:

http://research.microsoft.com/apps/tools/tuva/index.html#data=4|0||6b89dded-3eb8-4fa4-bbcd-7c69fe78ed0c||

Richard Feynman: The Relation of Mathematics and Physics

I see this (UK?) analyst Wicks supplying a future rather optimistic scenario in the context of HL.
Euan says that he doesn't want to discuss it right now -- that is fair since he is also probably working this stuff out on his own dime and time.

I just want to point out that HL as currently understood is based on a rather shaky premise, that of assuming a non-linear chaotic differential equation completely governs the oil production cycle. This equation is so constrained that it only allows one solution, and it forces people to look at the implications of the results in a very narrow focus. This I believe is dangerous as it leads to a likely unwarranted interpretation leading to an extrapolation for URR that may prove ultimately incorrect. It is clear that we have never seen a HL that works over the entire range of cumulative production. Granted it might work in historical cases over a range of cumulative (such as the USA) but this is in spite of itself, as we clearly don't understand the premise from which it arises, or perhaps rather, we don't want to. So I ask the question: How do we argue with Mr. Wicks unless we have a solid foundation to argue from?

I'm more of an historian.
I don't mean to be rhetorical, certainly not hyperbolic.
But the book I recommended is a good historical account of what actually happened when the Saudi military was given a military problem to solve. The results were not encouraging.

I continue to be interested in the Saudi stock market chart, a rather odd looking chart for a country with a "1,000 Gb of Resources," especially as oil prices went from an annual price of $56 in 2005 to $100 in 2008.

The sharp decline in early 2006 may be related to a lot of things, but it also correlates with the ongoing annual decline in Saudi oil production, relative to 2005. This was the time period in which the Saudi oil minister complained that they could not find buyers for all of their oil, "Even their light, sweet oil."

Richard Heinberg's August, 2006 observations & comment:

http://www.energybulletin.net/node/18904

Even worse news, potentially, comes from Saudi Arabia, where oil flows have shrunk by some 400,000 barrels per day over the past few months, despite astronomic prices. No one knows for sure what is going on. The Saudis themselves say the production cuts are due to lack of demand, but this hardly seems plausible, unless the kingdom is only able to deliver unwanted heavy, sour crude to market—but even in that case, one would expect flows to increase, with a price discount factored in for resource quality.

At the same time, the Saudis are hiring just about every spare drilling rig in the world, resulting in a dramatically falling rig count in the Gulf of Mexico—a place that would otherwise be seeing an increasing count, given the fact that Mexico’s giant Cantarell field is in now in steep decline, with dire implications for the nation’s economy.

Matthew Simmons (Twilight in the Desert) has been insisting for the past few years that Saudi production is close to peak and that Ghawar, the world’s biggest field, may be in decline. Now many others are speculating that this is the real reason for the falling production figures.

What happens next? It depends on the real condition of Ghawar. Perhaps a heroic drilling campaign could result in a temporary bloom in production, lasting perhaps three years, followed by a swift, terminal collapse. On the other hand, it is possible that the field has been so thoroughly exploited already that we are seeing the irreversible, rapid decline.

At the ASPO conference a well-connected industry insider who wishes not to be directly quoted told me that his own sources inside Saudi Arabia insist that production from Ghawar is now down to less than three million barrels per day, and that the Saudis are maintaining total production at only slowly dwindling levels by producing other fields at maximum rates. This, if true, would be a bombshell: most estimates give production from Ghawar at 5.5 Mb/d.

Money buys a lot of silence. If you want work or purchases from Saudi Aramco, it's best to clam up.

Mac, you are correct in that what you know depends on who you are. The publication "Petroleum Intelligence Weekly", and a few other publications, know a lot but they are subscription only. However occasionally someone leaks what they publish, like here:

One challenge for the Saudis in achieving this objective is that their existing fields sustain 5 percent-12 percent annual "decline rates," (according to Aramco Senior Vice President Abdullah Saif, as reported in Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and the International Oil Daily) meaning that the country needs around 500,000-1 million bbl/d in new capacity each year just to compensate.
Country Analysis Briefs: Saudi Arabia

Or here:

Sheikh Ali also confirmed to Al-Wasat newspaper that the state's proven oil reserves have fallen to 48 billion barrels, as reported last year by Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, down from an announced 100 billion barrels.
Kuwait plans big shake-up in oil sector

I have several pages of saved URLs that point to such information. Bottom line, what we do have is plenty of very good information. We don't need to make up stuff of which we have no source other than our own imagination. Not that there is anything wrong with speculation, but speculation can occasionally just get wild and crazy, like accusing Saudi of producing a lot more than they stated and the Royal Family is pocketing the difference. After all, even then we did have tanker counters and reports from other nations as to what they imported from Saudi Arabia.

It would be very difficult to over report or under report what you are producing. As an example Venezuela is trying to do that today. They claim they are producing over half a million barrels per day more than even OPEC reports in their Oil Market Report. Venezuela makes production claims that cannot be verified therefore everyone goes with what can be verefied. The same would be true for Saudi Arabia or anyone else.

Ron P.

mac -- I'll offer a speculation. I doubt the majors know agreat deal more. Not that they couldn't if they really tried but I don't think it's critical to them. OTOH if, let's say, the CIA wanted to get a good handle they could hustle together all the expats who have, and continue to work, in the KSA and generate a picture. Much of both the high and low end engineering is done by those folks. I haven't bumped into one in a quit a while but 20 years ago there was a lot of scuttlebutt from them about excessive production rates damaging Ghawar's ult recovery.

It would be nice to think of the CIA being on par with James Bond. But I don't.

Well is it all wild speculation ?

http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm

From 1982 to 1985, OPEC attempted to set production quotas low enough to stabilize prices. These attempts met with repeated failure as various members of OPEC produced beyond their quotas. During most of this period Saudi Arabia acted as the swing producer cutting its production in an attempt to stem the free fall in prices. In August of 1985, the Saudis tired of this role. They linked their oil price to the spot market for crude and by early 1986 increased production from 2 MMBPD to 5 MMBPD. Crude oil prices plummeted below $10 per barrel by mid-1986. Despite the fall in prices Saudi revenue remained about the same with higher volumes compensating for lower prices.

And

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_1980s_recession

http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/ECONREV/EconRevArchive/1985/4q85mill.pdf

And plenty more about the economic situation during that period.

Now the claim was a 3mbd increase in crude production tanked the price of oil in 1986.

Lets see if it passed the sniff test.

1.) US economy weak extensive globalization undercutting job growth high unemployment. Claims the recession has ended.
If it sounds a awful lot like 2009 then your on track to understanding the economy during that time period.

Now looking at prices.

http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Pri...

And look here remember there is a FLOOD of oil entering the market right 3mbd.

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=WCESTUS1...

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=W_EPC0_V...

So 3mbd *365 days = 1 billion barrels of oil.

Show me the data that accounts for this billion barrels of oil and I'll agree I'm speculating wildly.

If you actually LOOK at the data its nowhere to be found.

So 1 billion barrels and not a trace of them ...

Find them and I'll withdraw my "wild" speculation.

And of course the next issue is how much excess oil is required to drop oil prices significantly prices are set on the margin it does not take a lot of excess oil flooding the market to have a strong impact on prices esp if the world economy is weak when it happens. Looking at it from a supply demand angle anything from 500kbd to 1mbd is more than enough excess oil to significantly effect prices depending on the demand side a 50% drop in prices is reasonable. We saw a dramatic change in oil prices by at least 50% in the second half of 2008 with a slight change in the rate of decline of demand etc.

Next the paper I linked claimed that Saudi Revenue remained constant during 1986 offseting the drop in oil prices.

There is zero evidence of this.

http://books.google.com/books?id=bekED50mOJAC&pg=PA552&lpg=PA552&dq=Saud...

Plenty exists to show that the Saudi's finally decided to change direction and deal with internal problems that where becoming serious at this point.

http://countrystudies.us/saudi-arabia/34.htm

By late 1985, responding to domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia sharply boosted oil output in an attempt to regain its market share and to impose production discipline on other OPEC members. This policy led directly to the oil price crash of 1986.

This should read that by 1985 it became obvious that blatantly stealing the oil revenues and pocketing the money was going to lead to internal revolt. Under the cover of increasing production by 1mbd and claiming 3mbd the Saudi's skillfully managed to to hide the end of of the the largest graft operations in history. One can suspect that the devaluation of the US dollar played a large role in Saudi Arabia ending the flow of illicit oil into the large US market. We effectively did not pay for it.

The fact is was primarily a book keeping revision can be seen in the fact that this flood of oil is very difficult to find in practice. Not that oil production was not increased just the truth seems to be far less than the claims.

However prior to this a immense amount of wealth was generated and for the most part flowed directly to the pockets of the elite. The US via prostituting its large consumption of oil was able to operate the biggest money laundering game in history dwarfing the illicit drug trade.

This massive direct injection of wealth from the oil trade radically and fundamentally changed the global economy indeed as the new ultra wealthy class reinvested its illict gains it sparked the rapid growth of globalization. As large scale infusion of funds from the illict oil trade dried up the ultra wealthy increasingly looked for other means to expand wealth and increasingly impoverished the consumer class as its oil addiction became distinctly less profitable.

Whats interesting is that this game was repeated again following the collapse of the Soviet Union resulting in the creation of the Russian oligarchs as the new Russia opened up a similar trade.

Similar smaller scale examples exist in Nigeria and Venezuela for example.
Ironically Chavez's attempts to assert Venezuela's real oil production levels are met with skepticism if his claims are even reasonably true what happened to all the oil produced before he took power as certainly production capacity declined after he took over.

Call me a lunatic if you will but I've had no choice but to finally conclude that what really happened during the oil age is far less pleasant than we believe.

The US has been dramatically corrupted by money and power as it turned the liability of a massive oil addiction into the greatest source of wealth ever seen in the world.

He knows the cards that Saudi Aramco is holding and, while not saying exactly what they are, is saying they are bluffing.

Yes, and for the first time I heard Matt Simmons say that when he visited Al-Husseini just before the publication of Twilight In the Desert, Al-Husseini told Matt that he had the SPE papers published so that someone could assemble the clues.

Thats funny thats the sort of error range I get with my convoluted witchcraft tea leave reading approach :)

Even though I'm assuming different numbers and a whacked model the error term seems really tenacious. The slop if you will is itself interesting.

For the cumulative production the error seems to be as large as the entire oil production for the United States. You can drive a truck through it or damn near make any model work for a very long time.

External factors or shocks are critical to elimination of alternative models.

Even now all I can really tell is that either the shock model is correct i.e its done all the right things or its missed some large shocks that are really really hard to quantify.

Despite everything I'm deeply impressed with the model its right on.

Maybe a fairly esotric example will help I'm learning machining right now.

If you have a long thin rod in a lathe and you want to machine it down to a perfect cylinder is very hard as obviously the rod flexes in the middle. There are special follows and other tools to handle this flex but there is also a neat trick.

Instead of trying to cut the rod to size using a tool you simply use a file with very light pressure to true the rod.

A practical end run around a really narly problem. For me at least the shock model and dispersive discovery is like a lath or mill capable of really solving complex problems.

However every now and then you have to cheat and break the rules and figure out a practical solution to a really hard problem.

I'm absolutely at a loss on how to calculate the magnitude of complex shocks that may be large but depend on economic factors and technical factors.

I'm certain that there is a not small number thats really important and just as certain I have no clue on how to solve for it.

So screw it where is my file :)

Thanks for your further thoughts.

I bought into calls back in 06-07. Sold about a third out in 08, just about at peak. I bought in with over six figures of money that I had gotten by selling my house in a large city at the peak of the housing bubble.

Last summer, when I sold a third, I was still clinging to a bit of the old world, and I wanted enough money to fund expensive college educations for my remaining kids.

Within 6 months, however, I had decided to change my life in a major way. Part of that was giving up on the college tuition notion. As I sit here, I'm not sure college will even be an option in 5 years.

Knowing what I know now about my life and how I'm managing it (not about oil prices), I'd have cashed out everything and been happy.

I also had a "government number" in my head last summer. That number was 200. That was the number at which I thought the U.S. govt. would step in and change the rules of the oil trading game.

Now that number is 150, but that's only if oil gets to that number quickly - say from 80 to 150 within 4 or 5 months.

Having had last summer as a pre-run, the big players (airlines, auto, etc.) are a bit more organized and will move quickly to ask for the gov. to step in.

So my current plan, depending on timing, is to get half out if oil gets to 100 before spring (my calls are late 2010 and 2011 as well), and hang on to the rest to see if oil gets back to the 130 and higher range.

I actually am in the lucky position where I really don't need the money. If oil went to 10 tomorrow and stayed there, my day to day life would not change. The money I got from the housing bubble was really a windfall.

My main problem with bullion is that the gov will eventually force citizens to exchange their bullion for fiat - it's very simple and easy to do - FDR did it well - cite bullion holders as "hoarders," pass a ridiculously punitive law for folks who don't turn in the bullion, and exchange paper for gold. Simple and effective manner of exchanging government promises for hard assets.

I have based much of my current position on future oil production on the world's inability (or decision not) to produce more oil when oil spiked to 145. It's basic human common sense that any country with a capacity to pump more would have. They did not.

I think that is stronger evidence that we approach the precipice than anything else I have read or heard.

Says Simple Simon to the Pieman, "let me taste your ware."
Says the Pieman to Simple Simon, "show me first your penny."
Says Simple Simon to the Pieman - "Indeed! I have not any."

It's like that. I'm the Pieman. KSA is Simple Simon. Show me the oil, or you are presumed not to have it.

Time is a parameter. Think of it in these terms: Do you expect an interest-bearing bank account to pay back immediately? Of course you wouldn't. A compounding interest works over time, just as an increasing effort to explore all of the earth's oil bearing regions operates over time as well. Another good example is Moore's Law which says that speed doubles every 2 years as device density doubles.

In my opinion, ROCKMAN stated things perfectly and I would use it as a persuasive argument for creating a math model such as dispersive discovery. The tripling in search depth I actually covered in a previous post on TOD:
proposed

actual

from http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2712

The detailed questions that you pose concerning Dispersive Discovery shows that you have a good handle on the spatial characteristics. I treat the aggregate of the volumes as a set of varying volumes with either a set value or a range of values governed by a mean with a maximum entropy variance. The latter is known as the maximum entropy principle and it usually works when you don't know the extent of the variance, just like in failure analysis. I treat the distinction between working in 1, 2, or 3 spatial dimensions as an insignificant detail that doesn't really change the argument.

The next step is important, as you don't really have to worry about the size of a reservoir. Some fraction of the volume will contain reservoirs and the rest won't. The sizes are temporally mixed. Sam Foucher constructed a great plot showing that size is not the discriminator. http://www.theoildrum.com/files/DiscoveryPattern.png So all you have to do is generate a mix of reservoir sizes as you go through the volume.

The last ingredient which I think you might be missing is that the average search rate accelerates, yet the range in the search rates also shows a maximum entropy in dispersion. That is why we have these long tails, as the slow searches in inhospitable environments such as deep water are finally reaching the meat of the accelerating parts of the subvolumes.

Everything fits together mathematically and you can generate a logistic curve with a specific set of assumptions (such as a dispersed volume and exponential acceleration).

What is interesting about this derivation is that it is very similar to what a statistical physicist would do if he were dealing a large ensemble of particles in some volume. You essentially look for symmetry and try to maximize disorder. Entropy is a very powerful "force" and it works to our benefit as it smears all the detailed and specific geological information into a probability distribution. Geologists may not understand this concept because they were not necessarily trained to think this way. That's not their fault as the Dispersive Discovery theory does NOT help in any way to find a potentially productive region. It doesn't help them do their job if their job is to maximize profit for their employers. It simply sets the bounds for the trajectory of discoveries that an ensemble of prospectors of various skills would encounter. In other words, at best it is a depletion management tool, something that is critical as we move forward.

TG80 -- Again, excellent perceptions. I'll let Hub respond to the modeling aspect as I abhor such approaches and condemn all who embrace these false gods. (just teasing Web).

What does time have to do with a search for static elements? If I understand you it's not time per se but the advances not only in the technology but also geologic base knowledge. The earliest fields discovered in Texas were also some of the largest ever discovered in the state at any time. And they were often found by direct evidence of seeping oil. Mike Halbouty, a highly recognized geologist in Houston, once wrote about how his first boss (back in the 1930) would show him off to other wildcatters. Mike was one of the first geologists employed in an old industry that had been busy drilling for more than 25 years. A geologist working for an oil company was a novel experiment for that time. As the science of petroleum geology developed so did the technology. In time this allowed exploration in deep layers. But this brings us to a physical limiting factor. Only certain areas of the earth have the physical conditions that lead to the generation of oil/NG. With respect to oil exploration here is a depth limit to that haystack. But it's not really depth but temperature. Too hot and oil breaks down. Thus oil is limited not only spatially but also by depth related temperature. But mother does surprise us from time to time. Twenty years ago no one would have believed in the possible existence of oil at 34,000' in the GOM. But Mother has a temperature gradient in the GOM Deep Water much lower than we would have ever imagined. An additional problem with expecting a linear increase in oil potential as increased depths are explored is another little trick Mother plays on us: due to compression and chemical reactions as rocks are buried deep the volume of space that oil/NG might occupy is diminished. Mom just loves to mess with us.

Thus even though we think we've well defined that haystack we are forced to modify that volume over time. But now we're back to the scalability problem. The volume of petroliferous rocks known is huge. While new discoveries like DW GOM and Brazil generate those big headlines these newly added volumes are relatively small compared to the very mature regions such as the Gulf of Mexico. Exploration technology advances of the future won't open of new areas. The tools we have now are sufficient to search all known (and unknown) provinces. It's been the engineering advances that allowed the DW plays to jump into the headlines.

Modeling does have its merits. But you must have a volume of unexplored rocks to apply those models to. One can model the Arctic Basin using the very well established Gulf of Mexico model. Unfortunately the eventual drilling of the Artic Basin may show that model is completely invalid. Or not. Not worth arguing about. Drill it and find out. As far as more elephants existing it's certainly possible. But when you've pulled back the covers on 80% of all the elephant's favorite hiding places it tough to expect to find too many more. And that would include those hiding places you haven't thought of yet.

Thanks to you too, Memmel-and Rockman and WHT and Westexas and everybody elseincluding the site staff..

I will soon be able to describe myself as a well informed citizen in respect to energy at least as a result of following this site and asking you guys questions.

I don't know how many new followers the site has as a result of my talking it up bit I think there are three or four at least.

memmel -- And how close is close? An old geologist once said: "Oil is found in the minds of men". A tad sexist but it was from back in the day. Before we apply a technology we have to decide if there's cause. That's what he meant: can't find that needle if 1) you're not looking in the right spot and 2) can't find that needle if you can't convince management to look for it. I've seen many management teams fail over the last 30+ years. The vast majority didn't fail because they drilled dry holes. They failed because they didn't drill enough to find sufficient reserves. Fear of failure is a huge mental block for many.

Back to "close". About 30 years ago one of my best friends was drilling a very rank wildcat in S. La. Eventually he had no idea where he was in the geologic section. Drill a few hundred feet...log...see nothing… drill some more. Eventually they ran out of money and justification to drill deeper. The leases expired while Mike studied the situation. He thought he had the answer and was raising money to drill the well again but deeper. Before Mike could put the deal back together Exxon leased it and twinned the well he drilled. Less then 500' deeper then where Mike had stopped drilling they found $5 billion of NG/condensate and also opened up a brand new deep play. Mike had a 2% override royalty on the well and could have retired a millionaire before 30 yo. Even sadder then not making that big pay day he would have not been killed later in an accident while on an overseas gig.

And it’s not only old stories of just close enough. In a few weeks I’ll begin drilling another well in S. La. with a valid target of 20 million bbls of oil and 100 billion cf of NG. Even though the total depth is 17,000’ we'll just be drilling 1000’ below where another operator stopped drilling. Is our interpretation based upon some new high power tech? Nope. It’s based upon paleontology evidence…the same tool that’s been use in this region for over 50 years. If it works I wish I could claim credit for “finding it in my mind”. But, alas, it was generated by another geologist who we bought the idea from at a bargain basement price thanks to the down turn in the oil patch.

Some might think these anecdotes represent potential to avoid PO. As I said above it’s that scalability problem. There are great prospects to drill today. But not a sufficient volume to change the future course to any great degree IMHO. It's our success with such efforts that keep supplying the cornucopians with that kool-aid. Sorry about that but we have to make a living.

http://search.datapages.com/data/doi/10.1306/3D933388-16B1-11D7-86450001...

The total number of wildcats drilled in 1940 was 3,038, and the footage drilled was 10,253,948, as contrasted with 2,589 holes and 8,624,602 feet, respectively, in 1939. The average depth of hole increased from 3,331 feet to 3,375 feet for all states, and from 4,145 feet to 4,284 feet in the southern states. More locations were based on technical advice than hitherto, and the percentage of successes increased from 10.4 to 12.0.

The interesting thing is that your self taught wildcatter had a success rate of 10.4%
Advanced geological training did not dramatically increase the success rate at the time.

We know that huge advances occur over the span of decades. The fact that this data selects the difference between two successive years (in the midst of the depression years no less) and then claim that this is a trend? Something does not compute here.

Geez, it was warmer today than yesterday, I might as well throw out my winter clothes.

BP say 28.6 Gbs for Canada - so god only knows what number that is the IEA have used, certainly more akin to resource than reserves.

BP may be suffering from a taste of sour grapes since they sold their Canadian oil operations some years ago, and if they wanted to buy them back today they'd have to pay considerably more money for them. Most of the other giant multinationals are in the Canadian oil sands with both feet.

Most of the Canadian reserves are oil sands. There is no geological uncertainty about oil sands, because they outcrop on the surface and companies have drilled tens of thousands of wells to delineate them, but BP only counts oil sands if someone actually builds an oil sands plant on it. This is different from conventional oil, where a lot of the reserves are based on some national oil company's wild guess of what might be under an unexplored patch of desert.

The IEA got its numbers from the Canadian National Energy Board, which got its numbers from the provincial government regulatory agencies. Most of it is from the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board, which got its estimates by analyzing the data from the core samples and well logs from a few hundred thousand wells. Any company which drills a well in Alberta is legally required to turn all its data over to the provincial government, so there's little uncertainly in the process.

If you don't believe them, they'll sell you all the data on CD ROM for a few thousand dollars, and you can do your own analysis. They do this in hopes you will discover an oil field that nobody else has realized is there, which happens from time to time. You will note that this is considerably different than getting raw data out of Saudi Arabia.

A more likely scenario:

ELM kicks in in earnest (2012-2015?). Oil prices spike, despite ongoing depression conditions.

A federal government dominated by Quebec and Ontario politicians nationalizes oil sands production and begins emergency construction of a pipeline to send the production east.

By the time construction is complete, the awesome efficiency of government operation, combined with capital flight, and possibly even sabotage, has resulted in tar sands production actively declining.

As a final blow, the US, threatened by the loss of the only remaining secure exports available to it, invades Alberta. Destruction during the invasion and under occupation permanently limits production. The tar sands never produce more than 3 mbpd, and by 2030 are pretty much back to whatever accidentally leaks into the rivers.

I'd say that's as likely as ever seeing 6 mbpd from tar sands.