Report on ASPO Switzerland, September 26th, 2009, Conference at University of Basel
Posted by Francois Cellier on October 3, 2009 - 11:01am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Topic: Policy/Politics
Tags: aspo switzerland, peak oil [list all tags]

This report concerns the second annual General Assembly of ASPO Switzerland held in conjunction with its annual Peak Oil Conference.
Last year, I reported here at The Oil Drum about the Swiss ASPO conference. The change between last year and this year couldn't be bigger. Last year's conference was held May 24, 2008. At that time, the oil price was at $135/barrel and rising fast. Consequently, the aula of the University of Basel was filled to the last seat (400 people attended the meeting), Swiss TV was present, and several newspapers had sent reporters to gather first-hand information about this important event.
This year, with an oil price of $65/barrel and holding steady, ASPO's Peak Oil Conference was a non-event. There were roughly 100 attendees. You could call them the Peak Oil "diehards," and both TV and the press were absent. It was an event where "insiders" were talking to each other, whereas the public at large couldn't care less.
It was an interesting event nevertheless.
ASPO Switzerland differs in its "business model" from most other national ASPO organizations. ASPO Switzerland has individual members, each of whom pays an annual membership fee of CHF 100 (roughly $100). The organization also meanwhile has three industrial members, companies working to reduce the dependence of Switzerland on fossil fuels, among them a company installing solar systems and one specialized in thermal insulation of homes, that each pays an annual membership fee of CHF 3000.
By the summer of 2008, ASPO Switzerland had 350 individual members. The number of members was growing almost as fast as the oil price. Since the oil price peak of 2008, ASPO Switzerland has picked up another 20 members, i.e., most of those who had joined the organization in 2008 renewed their membership in 2009 in spite of the loss of interest in the topic by the mass media.
This year's conference opened with a talk by Daniele Ganser, President of ASPO Switzerland and a historian by trade who is specializing in the study of resource wars. Daniele is an experienced speaker, and his talk was well received. He is clearly the backbone of ASPO Switzerland. He offers between 30-40 talks every year to different organizations here in Switzerland, and he talks about Peak Oil to everyone willing to listen. In particular, he travels frequently to our capital, Berne, to talk to our politicians.
ASPO Switzerland counts among its members 23 members of the Swiss National Parliament, i.e., close to 10% of all national parliamentarians are individual members of ASPO Switzerland. These include politicians from all political parties. They have meanwhile formed a parliamentary study group to discuss the potential consequences of Peak Oil for Switzerland.
After Daniele Ganser, we heard a talk by Christa Markwalder, a member of the big chamber of the Swiss parliament (corresponding to a Representative to the U.S. Congress). She presented an overview of the discussions that have taken place in the Swiss parliament in the last 10 years concerning the issues of Peak Oil. She told us that several parliamentarians individually and also the Peak Oil study group as a body have made a number of "inquiries" to the National Council (the executive branch of the Swiss government) asking them specific questions about Peak Oil and what they planned to do about them.
Until now, it was difficult to get the attention of the National Council. The reason is that they orient themselves exclusively on the annual World Energy Outlook of the International Energy Agency. What the IEA writes is the gospel ... even though they change their story quite frequently, which makes long-term planning a tad difficult.
In its 2008 edition, the World Energy Outlook mentioned Peak Oil for the first time explicitly, and so, there is hope that our National Council may now take inquiries by our parliamentarians more seriously as well.
After Christa Markwalder, we heard a talk by Nicola Ruch, one among three high-school students, who had won this year a price of Schweizer Jugend forscht (Swiss Youth Science Fair) for their end-of-high-school project that they had written on Peak Oil: Die Menschheit auf dem Scheitelpunkt ihrer Entwicklung (Peak Oil: Humanity at the Zenith of its Development).
It was an emotional talk. Whereas I am skeptical that our politicians will ever do more than just talk about the problem, here I saw a vision, and a mission to make that vision a reality, and a passion to pursue that mission. After his talk, Christa Markwalder asked Nicola whether she could get a copy of his end-of-high-school project report. She would like to read it.
We then heard briefly from two CEOs of industrial ASPO members about their companies and their vision as to how to address the issues surrounding fossil fuel depletion.
After the break, Alex von Zelewsky, an emeritus professor of the University of Fribourg and board member of ASPO Switzerland, talked about Die Wissenschaft und der Peak Oil (Science and Peak Oil) and offered seven postulates concerning different aspects of Peak Oil.
The conference ended with a presentation I gave entitled Die 2000-Watt-Gesellschaft als Lösung? (Is the 2000 Watt Society a Solution?).
The roughly 100 participants, mostly ASPO members, who attended the event went home satisfied. ASPO Switzerland had done a good job catering to its members. Yet, the annual conference ought also to serve as a forum of outreach to people who have not spent much thought on the issues surrounding Peak Oil, and in this respect, the conference was an almost complete failure. It probably will take another rapid increase in the crude oil price to draw their attention.




GAIA Host Collective
I wanted to get this story out in a timely manner as it relates to a recent event, yet our pipeline for TOD stories is currently full (probably until Saturday). Thus, the report is currently only available on TOD Europe. It will get moved to the front page as soon as there is an open slot for it.
Hi Francois,
with reference to "Die 2000-Watt-Gesellschaft als Lösung? "
I cannot find a time span for the 2000 watts. Is this 2000 watts per year, per day or per life time?
Thanks
Dave
Watts are a measure of power, not energy. In other words, 2000W for a year is 365 (and change) times more energy than 2000W for a day.
It's 2000 W of constant power consumption per person.
So 2 kW * 8760 hours = 17520 kWh per year and person.
Switzerland is currently at 5000 W constant consumption per person:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_energy_consumption_per...
Only a few of the 23 MP's party affiliations are displayed on ASPO-CH's website. I could look them up but I'm lazy... are 80% of them SP/Grüne?
Not really. They are:
ASPO Switzerland makes it a point to be non-partisan. Resource depletion is a problem that concerns all of us, irrespective of our political convictions and orientation. Why the ASPO website lists the party affiliations of some of the parliamentarians and not of the others, I don't know. It makes little sense to me.
Thank you.
The website gives the wrong impression. The "liberal" parties are conspicuously missing though.
Thanks for this nice report.
Are slides or recordings of the presentations available?
And I think that the mentioned end-of-high-school project report might be interesting for many here at TOD.
Not generally. I linked to my own presentation, but don't have access to the others myself either. Nicola was asked whether he would make his end-of-high-school project report available, which he promised to do, but I haven't received it yet. Once I have a link, I'll provide it in this thread (assuming that I receive the link before the thread is closed for comments). I'll send him an email at once to remind him.
I meanwhile received feedback from Nicola Ruch. You can find his end-of-high-school project report here (PDF format) with an appendix stored in a separate file (also PDF format).
Thanks a lot, Francois!
Thanks Mr. Cellier for posting your presentation, which for me was in parts a real eye-opener last Saturday! Just sad that it didn't reach more people...
Michael Pachlatko - staff coordinator for the ASPO Oil Conference 2009
I suppose I should join. I'll get round to it.
thanks for the report, and the good work.
Problem: my German is almost nil.
Hi Noizette:
There are efforts underway to organize a (probably smaller) meeting, maybe a round table discussion, in Geneva. This would then be held in French. Yet, these are only vague ideas until now, and I don't know when this might happen.
"ASPO Switzerland counts among its members 23 members of the Swiss National Parliament, i.e., close to 10% of all national parliamentarians are individual members of ASPO Switzerland."
How is it the Swiss polititians are peak oil aware while the rest of Europe are not?
Switzerland is a small country with a political structure that is relatively flat, i.e., at least for people with a bit of influence, such as university researchers (like Daniele Ganser), it is relatively easy to get in touch with our politicians and talk to them. Daniele makes it a point to travel to Berne several times every year to talk to the Swiss parliament ... and our politicians do listen.
Unfortunately, this doesn't mean that the Swiss public at large is informed. They are not.
I would feel a lot better about my own country(US) if we had even five percent of our congress willing to join a peak oil forum.
Considering the fact that tax on oil and support of efficiency and renewable energy are still small in Switzerland compared to other European countries, I don't think that many Swiss politicians really care about reducing the Swiss dependence on oil.
Also keep in mind, that Switzerland consumes still more energy in form of oil and gas for heating than it consumes electricity.
True.
Because of our consensus politics, change comes very slowly to Switzerland. It takes only a few lobbyists to prevent change ... and those we got. People like Rolf Hartl are doing an excellent job at preventing change, i.e., at keeping fossil fuel dependence high here in Switzerland.
... and yet, I am still mildly optimistic. If you look back to the 1950s and 1960s, you may understand why. Before that time, essentially all Swiss houses were heated using central coal heaters. Within only 10 years, the coal disappeared almost entirely from Swiss houses and was replaced by oil. Granted, oil heaters were more convenient, because you didn't need to reserve an entire room for storing coal and you didn't have to shovel coal into the oven once every few hours, and also, times were different: Switzerland (and the world) were in an expansion phase, i.e., money was easily available, but I am confident that Switzerland can do it again. We are still rich, and if and when oil supply becomes problematic, either because of rationing or because of price, the Swiss will happily exchange their central oil heaters for something else, and if it takes insulating their houses better, they'll do that also.
It is, however, important to continue on our educational mission.
I don't know if this is off-topic, but could I ask a question about oil production?
As I understand it, Colin Campbell's 12/09 newsletter projected 55MB/D by 2030, but Kjell Aleklett, President of ASPO International, says production is likely to fall 11 per cent, to 76 million barrels a day. See page 40 of the presentation: http://www.aspo-australia.org.au/References/Aleklett/20090611%20Sydney4.pdf .
Where does the difference come from?
Nick -- This might sound patronizing but please don't take it that way. Anyone's projection of energy supplies at any time in the future will be determined by what assumptions they make. Each person will justify their assumptions. That 21 million bbl/d variance is seen in the individual categories: new field discoveries, enhanced oil recovery, etc. How does one calculate how much new oil will be discovered by 2030? You don't. I've been doing this for 34 years and I can't testify with any great certainty how much oil a well I just completed last week will ultimately produce. So how can I estimate how much oil wells that won't be drilled for 20 years will produce? But not knowing doesn't prevent me from making assumptions. Thus any number someone throws out will be exactly right. As long as their assumptions are correct, of course.
So, you're saying that neither prediction means much? hmmm.
Well, I know what you mean about assumptions. Really, that's what I'm asking: what differences are there in the assumptions, definitions and categories?
After all, these two people know each other and are familiar with all the same information - I can't believe their projections really differ as much as they appear to.
They might differ by half as much as you're suggesting (or even less). Aleklett is evidently talking about liquids rather than oil. Is Campbell talking about liquids as well? Can you link to that newsletter?
Aleklett is evidently talking about liquids rather than oil.
Yes, I suspect that's most of the difference.
I'm trying to find the newsletter again, but they've re-organized the Irish ASPO website, and I can't find it. Frustrating...
Nick -- Their specific assumptions need not differ greatly given the time span of the projections. Over a 21 year span the difference between a 4% decline rate and a 5% DR will be significant. Given the absolute secrecy many of the oil exporters maintain regarding their fields how can one argue over a 1% variance? Projecting discoveries is even more difficult. In the last 6 or 7 years many billions of bbls have been discovered in Deep Water Brazil. How many folks would you guess had projected that possibility 21 years ago. My guess is zero. Some folks are projecting billions of bbls in the Artic. And what will they say if no one makes a single commercial discovery there in the next 21 years? I'm pretty sure it will go something like this:"Oh well...those assumptions were wrong. Here's our new model. Just go ahead and plan your future on it."
Bottom line: no one can point to a spot anywhere on the globe and say X bbls of oil per day will be producing here in 21 years. And I mean absolutely no one. And no one would have the nerve to try to convince anyone they can. But anyone can make any prediction of total global production 21 years down the road and easily justify it by saying "according to my assumptions" this is how it will play out. This throws you into the "my assumptions are more valid than our assumptions" arena. And that debate is meaningless to the general public IMO. And the politicians will spin it it what ever mannor aids their re-election efforts. But great fodder for us at TOD. Gives us something to do on an early Sunday morning while waiting for the coffee to brew.
Nick -- been thinking how to explain how difficult (i.e. damn near impossible) it is to do what they are trying to do. Don't want to go the hard core statistical analysis route...send us into a coma. But then it hit me. To buy this explanation you'll have to accept that I have learned a thing or two about reservoir engineering over the last 34 years. Here's the set up: let's assume I have in front of me, at this very moment, all the data on all the wells drilled in the next 21 years. All the 3d seismic, all the well log data describing in great detail the rock and oil properties, all the production tests on these wells indicating their exact flow potential, all the detailed reservoir maps generated from all the deliniation and development wells.
Now I'll apply all the standard and fully accepted reservoir modeling techniques. But it's good to know that this approach is generaly done using ranges of values. A given reservoir rock doesn't have a porosity of 28%. It has porosities that range from 24% to 31%. Likewise the oil saturation isn't 65% but ranges from 52% to 70%. And the sweep efficiency (how well the oil moves through the reservoir isn't 35% but ranges between 20% and 45%. I think you get the idea. Monte Carlo simulation of such parameters got very hot when I graduated school all those decades ago. Now I apply those universally accepted calculating methods and I arrive at a range of production coming out of the ground in the year 2030. It's quit possible that the range of this analysis could be on the same order as the 55 mmbopd to 77 mmbopd that those two fellows offer.
Remember: they're estimating how much oil will be flowing from fields that haven't been discovered yet let alone developed. How can their assumptions about wells that don't exist be more accurate then my calualations where I have all the infinate details? I'm not saying those guys aren't smart nor are any specific assumptions invalid. But they are trying to calculate an answer that cannot be calculated. But they can generate a model based upon a set of assumptions.
And this leads me to my basic (and somewhat vulgar) view of reservoir modeling: what does reservoir modeling have in common with masterbation? Answer: if you're not careful you start beleiving it's the real thing.
LOL :)
Like your story and thanks for making it from the "real world" side.
I think there is way way to much faith in the expectation of events taking the form of either a slow declining symmetric peak now or one some point in the reasonably near future i.e 20 years.
In my mind even with all the data as you point out we have significant uncertainty in future production. I argue its actually really tough to know if we are 50% 70% or 80% depleted. This may sound at first crazy but its a mix of uncertainty in estimating future production from existing production as you point out and additional uncertainty concerting future production not only in new production but also even bigger infield drilling in existing fields.
The largest source of oil today are new wells drilled in existing fields either in continuous production or not. My best guess is 50% or more of the worlds oil production is coming from wells drilled in fields after they had reached their mature production stage.
The number of infield wells we can drill and the productivity of these wells is obviously finite yet no one even looks to see if infield drilling is starting to fail to deliver despite its critical role in maintaining oil production.
Obviously my fast collapse model assumes that this source of production will rapidly fall off over time and the ever larger number of producing infield wells will accelerate depletion.
I find it amazing that people can walk right past the biggest single problem we face in oil production and not even see it. Everyone wants to look into the future at reserve growth and new discoveries. Yet half the oil wells in the world where drilled in the US primarily simple horizontals and all we managed was a symmetric decline. Whats going to happen in the rest of the world sure they did not drill as many wells but in general secondary recover was used earlier and more adeptly and horizontals seem to have been more widely deployed.
And obviously the infield drilling campaign globally has kept oil production high but at what cost ?
What happens when it comes to and end and is no longer productive ? We know if the globe goes on and insane drilling campaign then at best it could follow the US barring this the outcome has to be worse.
Our short term future lies in whats really happened in our existing fields that have been in production for ten or more years how depleted these fields really are will determine future production flow rates and yet to find oil is really a small player vs this problem. And yes our existing fields could readily be 70% plus depleted with a very reasonable set of assumptions.
memmel -- I think you hit the key point right on the head. First, the general public/politicians cannot digest the discussion. They have neither the education nor, more importantly IMO, the patience to understand production decline models. But they all readily grasp announcements regarding multi-billion bbl oil discoveries off Brazil and elsewhere. They also immediately accept stories regarding the billions of POTENTIAL bbls in the Artic and elsewhere. Such statements are verbal comfort food for them. Unfortunately they cannot/won't understand the production rate side of those stories. And, IMO, any effort to explain that 10 billion bbls of future DW BZ oil won't replace declines in production rates from existing fields is more wasted breath.
I agree that predictions are very difficult.
But, what do you think? Are these estimates completely worthless? Do you think we have enough information to predict a peak, or declines?
What's your best estimate (together with error bars)?
Sorry for the delay Nick. There are days when I view such estimations as more than just worthless but dangerous. Folks on either side of the issue can take these various numbers from the "experts' and use them to swaw public opinion. It reminds me of an old salesman trick. I'm selling watches. You look at a high end job for $2000 and a utilitarian watch for $80. Can't justify paying the big bucks so you start leaning towards the cheapo. But as a good saleman will do, he pops out a very nice watch for just $600. Now it's a lot easy to buy the $600 watch...saving all that money by not going for the $2000. But in reality the salesman had you on the $600 watch when you walked thru the door. BTW...the profit margin on the $600 watch was higher then either of the other two watches.
Offer folks two extreme positions (doom&gloom or cornucopian) and they'll usually be more likely to go to the middle ground. There is no middle ground for PO IMHO. Do nothing will be just about as bad as making bad choices.
Ok, so you feel that:
1) oil has peaked or will very soon.
2) the decline rate after peak will be steep enough that we need to deal with that urgently.
3) the decline rate won't be so steep that we should give up all hope.
Beyond that, you feel it's not worth guessing.
Is that a fair summary of your views?
FWIW, I would agree with that.
Nick -- 1) Not ducking the question but I've never thought of it as "peak oil" per se. I'm more of a plateau oil type. We probably hit the plateau a few years ago and it will run another 3 or 5 years. Along this plateau there are moments when oil production could fall short of consumers with the cash to pay. And then we'll slip back under the curve as we just did due to the economic slow down. A few big discoveries might tempt us to think we're in better shape and then the sudden/rapid decline of a Cantarell Field pushes pushes our thoughts in the opposite direction. I'm not entirely sure we'll ever reach a clear peak due to the now obvious link between production rates, prices and economic viability. Let's say in 2012 it's very clear that the world wants to buy more crude then the producers can deliver at maz effort. Then the prices go up and demand is tempered. Prices go up enough and economic decline becomes severe. Oil demand drops as do the price. Thus we never see a point in time when there isn't enough crude for those who can pay. Which isn't the same as all consumers getting what they want. So maybe more of a plateau with a series of downward steps. But even this future model gets very cloudy when you start to throw the more politically/militarially/economicly strong start denying access to the crude market by the weaker. China is currently using its economic strength to take future production out of the market place. And, as I've mentioned before, I foresee the American public demand that the gov't use whatever means available to usurp oil resources.
2&3)Decline rates: I suppose it goes to what "steep" means. When this topic comes up I don't tend to think of an actual production curve with a particular downward slope. Over a fairly long cycle (10 to 20 years) we'll be producing less oil. The natural decline will be masked to some degree by the factor I mention above. But I do think that globally we're on the unstoppable downside of the Hubert curve. The slope and changes in the same will be more controlled by above ground factors as we go foreward IMHO.
Yes, a plateau for another 3-5 makes sense to me. What do you think of Aleklett's projection of a roughly 11% decline in all liquids in 20 years - does it seem very roughly in the ball-park, depending on social events?
China is currently using its economic strength to take future production out of the market place.
Could you expand on that? My understanding was that China was locking up supplies for itself - is that what you meant? Do you see them taking ownership outright, or just signing long-term contracts (which still leaves them the problem of paying for it) and investing in companies in other countries (which gives them influence, but not outright control).
As for economic decline - it all depends on how it's managed. The collapse of the housing bubble was only indirectly caused by oil prices. If a growing oil-trade-deficit gradually lowers the dollar and raises interest rates, that will put a gradual speed limit on the US economy.
As far as resource wars go - the Iraq war clearly was a resource war, but it wasn't sold as one. I don't think the American public would go for that, just as the UK public didn't go for the wholesale slaughter that would have been necessary to keep it's colonies after WWII, and the US public made the same choice in Vietnam.
Ultimately, converting to EVs and doing a little carpooling would be far less painful than resource wars.
Nick – I haven’t read Aleklett’s piece so I’m not sure. As a general rule I don’t pay too much attention to anyone’s numbers. But if the projection is an 11% decline from the max rate today in 20 years that strikes me as extremely optimistic. I tend to think more qualitatively. If the global economy, or at least a major portion such as China and India, grows at decent rate I see a major crisis coming long before 20 years. I have zero faith the US will make anything close to major gains in alts or conservation. To do so would impact the economy more severely then our public would accept.
As far as China locking up future crude I’m not sure how it’s split but I think the majority of their investments have led to direct ownership of crude with contract volumes secondary. I don’t have the link in front of me at the moment but I saw a story in which Boone Pickens estimates the Chinese have invested at least $200 billion in future FF production. No idea if that’s a god number but I wouldn’t be surprised. I feel locking it up for itself is the prime motive but it also becomes an excellent barter weapon. Don’t have to pay for a crude option if here’s someone out there who’ll buy it from you. If China wants U.S. (or any other country) cooperation then they can dangle a few 100 million bbls in front of them. I hadn’t thought of it but China may be anticipating an opportunity to replace supplying the world with plastic toys with supplying crude and LNG. But in the end I see China having to make a choice: watch their markets decline and lose sales or help those major buyers with FF to keep them writing checks. And if they fear the U.S. defaulting on loans to China that might be all the incentive they need to try to keep us healthy.
History is always subject to one’s perspective. I see the initial move by the French in VN as an effort to reclaim formerly owned tin and rubber resources. We joined in for a variety of reasons IMO. The U.S. public did make a choice to engage in a conflict that cost 60,000 American lives. They may have eventually lost their original motivation but the country was very much behind the original effort. Not sure how old you are but if you’re much under 50 you might think Hollywood’s depiction of the American attitude towards the VN war was always negative. Far from it. Lots of American voices rejecting the war in Iraq…many from the onset. Did we pull out after a few years? Have we pulled out now the Dems are in complete control? Maybe they just haven’t had the time t reorganize. Think we’ll still have significant military forces deployed in the ME 5 years from now? I do. Do you think when the day comes and the American people start to suffer severely from the effects of PO they'll accept another 60,000 body bags? Maybe another 160,000? IMHO, yes…I see them justify the carnage as the price that has to be paid to preserve “our way of life”. I know that’s not a nice view of our fellow citizens but my attitude is well earned. Being 18 yo and poor in 1969 can do that to you. I understand what you mean by the pain of switching to EV’s/carpooling is less then warfare but not if you aren’t the one bleeding. Severe pain is very easy to accept…when it’s someone else’s. Bitter words of an old man? Hell yeah. But it doesn’t change the facts as I see them.
Sorry for the mini-rant last night Nick. Sometimes my frustartion with the foolishness/stupidity of our fellow citizens gets the better of me.
No, I understand. I get very, very frustrated too, esp with the Iraq war.
Re: Aleklett. I think he's including all liquids, and assuming a reasonably strong growth of ethanol, etc (which is probably realistic, for better or worse for the environment).
Re: resource wars. I think it's important to keep in mind the mis and dis-information in the VN & Iraq wars. The Vietnam "conflict" was sold to the public as a firebreak against the USSR and China. Remember how Tonkin Gulf was portrayed as N VN agression? Television brought home the human cost of the war to the US public, and public support fell.
Iraq was sold as a defensive response to 9/11 - 25% of the US public still believe Saddam Hussein was involved in 9/11. I think you'll find very, very few supporters of the war frame it in terms of oil (except for Dick Cheney, of course, before he was in office).
And, no, I don't think people will choose war over carpooling - not unless they're misled by their leaders - it's very, very important to Americans to be on the right side of morality. Not to mention the minor detail that war would actually be counter-productive to oil access, just as the Iraq war was.
Nick -- Probably the term "resource war" is not the best choice for me to offer as a vision of the future. I don't envision a shooting war per se (although I can anticipate some occasional ground actions). I see it more as intimidations and shows of strength particular when it comes to enfluencing the politicians of a particular region. But whatever level of aggression we do eventually see I have no doubt it will be cloaked in self-serving platitudes as you've described.
Nick -- Probably the term "resource war" is not the best choice for me to offer as a vision of the future. I don't envision a shooting war per se (although I can anticipate some occasional ground actions). I see it more as intimidations and shows of strength particular when it comes to enfluencing the politicians of a particular region. But whatever level of aggression we do eventually see I have no doubt it will be cloaked in self-serving platitudes as you've described.
I agree pretty much with Rockman. We don't know how much oil will be produced, because that depends on the price of oil, and it is impossible to come up with a model that will predict the oil price with any degree of confidence.
What I have done a few months ago is calculate the upper limit of the oil price. At $600/barrel, the world is spending everything that it makes just on acquiring energy. This is clearly not reasonable. Thus, the upper limit may be closer to $200/barrel, but even this number is not solid. What I also showed is that the rich nations, like the U.S. and Switzerland, can pay more for the oil than poorer nations before their respective economies get suffocated.
At the current time, there is enough oil available to satisfy, at a price of $70/barrel, the needs of everyone who can pay $70/barrel. As we come off the plateau, this will be no longer the case, i.e., there won't be enough conventional oil available any longer to satisfy the needs of those who can pay for the commodity. Then the price will rise further.
The most benign scenario is that the price will grow slowly and gradually. In this case, some new sources of oil will become economically exploitable (deep-sea oil, heavy sour oil) that will last us a while longer. The more gradually the price will rise, the slower the decline will be, at least for a while. A rapid increase of the oil price leads invariably to instability, i.e., a rapid economic decline accompanied by a rapid reduction in demand.
As the price of oil increases, more countries will drop out of the rat race, because they no longer can pay that price. The countries with the deepest pockets will hold out the longest, and will have enough oil for their own needs for a few more years than everyone else.
Well you need to slash the middle class in the wealthy countries by at least 50%.
I think the mistake your making is assuming that the number of people in the middle class in the wealthier countries will remain constant.
As the middle class collapses and accepts any work at lower wages profitability will improve and costs will decrease as real wages fall. To some extent of course demand will fall but for now lets assume that the shrinking middle class spends everything it can on oil and steadily drops other expenditures.
Basically even as aggregate wages fall what happens is oil costs make up and ever larger percentage of expenses say up to 15-20% of income. At this point serious attempts to not use oil are made at and individual basis. However we make the further assumption that despite this in general infrastructure contraints make this a slow process.
I'll skip over the details but the short version is the maximum price for oil only occurs after the system has eliminated all of its debt. They vast majority via default. In particular you assume that housing costs fall close to zero before calculating the maximum price for oil.
What I tend to end up with no matter how I do it is about a 50% reduction in the number of people actually living middle class lifestyles about a 25% reduction in overall oil usage for the middle class and a price for oil around 400 plus per barrel and easily as high as 600-800. Now overall oil usage is a lot harder to figure but a further 10% total drop in total in the wealthy countries seems probable.
Its interesting how you can wipe out about half the middle class and still see oil usage only drop 10% and for most unthinkably high oil prices however in my opinion the key is the amount of debt thats available to default on. As mortgage defaults rise housing costs fall rapidly and given the large precentage of income made up by housing there is a tremendous amount of room to endure higher oil price even as net income falls.
For example lets say you make 50k a year and have 1000 dollar house payment. You lose your job and your house and your car if you have a payment and eventually move back with your parents or into a slum apt and take a job making 25k and say you get a cheap car to go to work.
Your oil usage does not change at all through all this i.e it can go in any direction up down sideways with any possible outcome no change is the most likely. Only now once you reach this point are you forced to really conserve oil as prices rise further. Other slightly more fortunate people will be following you down this curve. And of course its obvious housing prices are obliterated so more and more people will default on their loans and stay in their homes for longer and longer periods paying zero for housing.
200 a barrel should certainly start this process again but its a slow process and oil demand falls even slower so it seems to me at least that the pressure from oil prices has to go much much higher to bankrupt half the middle class in the wealthy nations and until it does oil demand cannot start decaying in a meaningful way. Given that the wealthy nations will almost assuredly enforce their minimum wage laws and even with this wages will fall fairly rapidly enough to offset rising expenses at the company level we should see a larger build in prices. For companies of course the problem is demand for their products will wane so even as wages fall overall demand falls along with it.
And of course even with rising oil prices overcapacity and credit deflation will make it difficult for them to increase prices. But we can assume that in general they won't just shut down operations until after they have exhausted all credit options and wage cuts and layoffs. They can and will run in the red until no longer possible. One can expect repeated government intervention generally propping up the worst companies to stall the decline.
The only reasonable way to handle peak oil is to reduce debt to zero and move to a stable zero or negative growth economy relentlessly and aggressively cutting oil consumption. The various forces arrayed to prevent this are powerful and will slow the movement towards the right answer therefore consistently keeping oil usage abnormally high even as the price increases.
Net result is prices have to go to "ridiculous" levels to get demand to decline the pressure has to be so large that the fundamental shift I'm describing is forced on the system and either it changes or collapses. For all intents and purposes it has to rip the system or break it in order to force demand to decline as long as it can be propped up it will. Its very much a irresistible force vs immovable object type of problem. The net result is extreme changes in price.
This is fundamentally different from what happened up till now when the biggest debt bubble in history popped. This is the destruction of the fabric of the fiat based debt economy not elimination of its excesses. That was a pin prick its time for the crushing hammer blows.
Its a war in every sense of the word including military conflicts.
Francois,
I agree that the effect of an oil-induced economic slowdown in oil-importing countries imposes a limit to oil prices - probably about $100/bbl.
Don't forget that oil consumption/demand isn't static: today's EV/PHEVs become price-competitive with oil at about $70/bbl. As they grow, economies of scale will make them decisively cheaper than ICE's, and they'll replace ICEs.
The advantages Switzerland has over the U.S.
1. Small, relatively homogenous, educated population.
2. 10% Political Awareness.
3. A history of self-nationalism against the tide.
4. Fiscally prudent and solvent nation and people.
5. No significant domestic energy industry blowing smoke.
6. No significant international energy industry running interference.
7. No significant global presence to maintain.
8. Grave exposure to a loss of imports.
9. A tendency to think globally and act locally.
And yet with all these advantages which should propel Switzerland leaps and bounds ahead of the U.S., Switzerland has not taken significant action to mitigate peak oil.
This is all the more reason that I am diresomely pessimistic about our options for the future. It seems there will be no pre-arranged bastions of civilized decline. If the Swiss don't succeed, how can any political system pretend that it can?
I hope you succeed Mr. Cellier, but I fear the globalist adjenda has rendered your nation impotent to the self-preservation actions your nation took to avoid WWII.
The complete lack of effective national/political action worldwide is why I have turned my back on the globalist political adjenda and encourage others to do the same. Take care of yourself, your neighbors, and your community if you can. If you don't nobody else will. Those who proclaim that we must take care of strangers are evil and ought to be fed to the dogs. Your community might resemble Switzerland during WWII, which was mighty horrible, but every other option was worse.
In WWII Switzerland watched all of Europe implode and remained neutral. Today Switzerland should stop exporting electricity, raise import/export/transit tariffs dramatically, stockpile everything, send all immigrants home and strengthen defensive military positions. To withdraw is to voluntarily choose being poor over uncontrolled poverty. Everything else is just happy slappy talk.
Good luck. You'll need it.
Cold Camel
You don't understand Switzerland or its history. Please desist from your hate speech. Ganser studies the likes of you.
You give very bad advice. Switzerland requires food and fertilizer imports. It's fortunate enough to have friendly and reasonably stable neighbors capable of producing more food than their population requires and of shipping it to Switzerland with nuke-powered rail. A xenophobic and militaristic policy would be suicidal.
Yes. Switzerland cannot go it alone.
In WWII, Switzerland was able to feed its population of 4 million people ... barely. At that time, it had about twice as much arable land available as today, because a lot of the former arable land has meanwhile been urbanized. The population has also grown from 4 million people during WWII to currently 7.85 million people.
Switzerland currently imports 40% of its food, and the situation won't improve.
We live in a globalized world, and in some ways, this is good. However, it should not prevent us from doing what is in our power to reduce our dependence on energy imports, and Switzerland has not done enough in this respect in the last 20 years.
I am mildly optimistic because I see that our politicians are largely reasonable people, and because i see that the dialog is increasing, i.e., more time is being spent by the media (in particular, TV and radio) to discuss energy issues, and this should lead to a better informed public within the coming years.
I don't believe it would be very hard to live with less (but not zero!) energy imports if it was widely understood that there's a crisis and that flexibility was required.
Fossil fuels extraction is still geographically diversified enough that I can't imagine a scenario in which fossil fuel imports would fall drastically anytime soon.
Food and fertilizer are stickier problems. The supply is vulnerable and there is less potential for quick substitution and waste reduction. In particular, I don't know that Europe could meet its phosphate requirements without intercontinental trade. Unpredictable climate change is another issue of concern.
I'm less optimistic than you because I don't think that reasonable politicians and TV/radio programs are likely to lead to much more than window-dressing.
It's the political system which has to behave reasonably and not individuals. Entrenched interests must be confronted, complex problems must be addressed and tough decisions are called for but I haven't seen any indication that this is something the political system is capable of. Witness the management of health care for instance. A crisis might turn the political system around but some things need many years of preparation... and counterproductive scapegoating is just as likely as a response.
An off topic question but are there any tensions between the various Swiss peoples who speak different languages as there is in Belgium between the Wallons and Flemish?
Yeah but it's tame. I don't know about the situation in Belgium but, so far as I know, there's been no loss of life in Switzerland over the issue for over 15 years.
Not in a major way. There could be problems, because the different language regions are of drastically different sizes. Roughly 62% of the Swiss speak Swiss-German; roughly 30% speak French; roughly 7% speak Italian; and roughly 0.5% speak Rhaeto-Romanic. Thus at least in theory, the Swiss-German speakers could dominate Swiss politics. Yet, our political system prevents this.
This is the primary reason why the Swiss are pursuing consensus politics at all levels. In our government, all political parties, all religious confessions, and all language regions are represented. In our government and in our highest court, all four languages can be spoken, and whenever there are differences of opinion, we try to discuss, until a consensus has been reached. This makes Swiss politics very slow and sluggish and is probably one of the main reasons, why so little has been accomplished in recent years to pro-actively deal with the looming problems of resource depletion.
Lobbyists have it easy here in Switzerland to block change because they don't need to convince a majority. It is sufficient to get a relatively small minority to their side, and no change will take place. The discussions will drag out forever.