World Oil Exports [01] Angola
Posted by Luis de Sousa on July 1, 2008 - 10:00am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Topic: Supply/Production
Tags: angola, exports, oil exports, original, woe, world oil exports [list all tags]
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Angola is one of the few oil producing countries with a bright future ahead. Decades of war prevented the country from developing it's energy resources properly, but is now becoming one of the largest world oil exporters in a period of rampant prices. Just as if Fortune decided to compensate Angola for its misfortunes during the XX century.
Becoming an OPEC member just recently, Angola is set to build one of the strongest economies in Africa, with its GDP growing over |
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Some History
To read a not so short History of Angola, click here.
Production
Colin Campbell first assessed Angola in December of 2003 in ASPO's newsletter 36. Back then it was already clear that the Regular Oil cycle was approaching peak (if not already past it). It was also clear that Deep Water fields were coming strongly on stream promising to more than double the country's production. Using 10 Gb for both Regular Oil and Deep Water ultimates, the best estimate was resulting in a total production peak by 2020 just under 2 Mb/d.
Figure 1 - Colin Campbell's Angola forecast in 2003. Click to enlarge.
Acknowledging the difficulty of estimating the Deep Water cycle shape at such an early stage, Colin Campbell put forward three different scenarios. The first (A) modelled the hypothesis of the country using all productive capacity as soon as it became available, the other two (B and C) considered a different approach in which the resource would be explored in a slower fashion, extending the economic income in time. These last two scenarios resulted in later and lower peaks. Scenario B would be the one chosen for the forecast this time.
Figure 2 - Colin Campbell's Deep Water scenarios for Angola in 2003. Click to enlarge.
Production in Angola would rise steeply, more than doubling from 2003 to 2007. Meanwhile, by the end of 2006 it was announced that Angola was joining OPEC. Without a quota attributed, Colin Campbell would reissue his forecast for Deep Water (newsletter 73), this time preferring scenario A, and extending the previous ultimate to 12 Gb, allowing for a possible later cycle of discovery.
Figure 3 - Colin Campbell's Deep Water forecast for Angola in 2007. Click to enlarge.
And finally in December of 2007 OPEC announced Angola's quota: 1.9 Mb/d. Official reactions were scarce, but at the time, with the country already producing close to that figure, some disappointment was ventilated in the press:
Some oil companies have expressed concern about an OPEC quota potentially putting the brakes on Angola's rising oil prospects.
[...]
An Angolan oil official recently said his country would be happy with a quota of 2.5 million barrels a day, a figure which industry analysts say would be about 500,000 barrels a day above real output capacity.
But a few months later Syanga Abílio (Sonangol's vice-president) would assure that the country's policy was in line with the given quota:
"It's possible to reach that production [2 Mb/d] still this year ... this for sure may occur in the last quarter of this year,"
[...]
"We are doing our best to maintain our plateau of 2 million barrels, probably until 2014. Our production profile does indicate normal decline (after 2014) which we will be fulfilling with our exploration programme,"
Also countering Colin Campbell's later assessment is the fact that new production capacity coming on stream in 2008, 2009 and 2010 is not enough to fulfil the expected jump from 1.6 Mb/d to 2.7 Mb/d in Deep Water production up to 2010. New projects coming on stream listed by the Oil Megaprojects page and the EIA are in the following table. A chart of Angola's concessions blocks can be found here; only blocks 0 and 14 are in Cabinda's waters.
| Year | Field | Peak output (kb/d) |
| 2008 | Block 4 Gimboa | 50 |
| 2008 | Block 15 Kizomba C (Mondo) | 100 |
| 2008 | Block 15 Kizomba C (Saxi; Batuque) | 100 |
| 2009 | Block 0 (Area A Mafumeira) | 30 |
| 2009 | Block 14 (Landana; Tombua) | 100 |
| 2009 | Block 14 (Negage) | 75 |
| 2010 | Block 17 (Pazflor) | 200 |
| After 2010 | Block 31 NE | 130 |
| After 2010 | Block 31 SE | 130 |
| After 2010 | Block 18W | 100 |
| After 2010 | Block 15 (Kizomba D ) | 120 |
| Planned | Block 17 (Clov ) | 150 |
| Planned | Block 32 | 130 |
In light of the information gathered here, an alternate forecast for Deep Water Oil is used, more in line with Colin Campbell's original B scenario, but this time with an ultimate of 12 Gb. Production is forecast to reach 1.5 Mb/d by late 2009 and from there slowly growing to support a total production (Regular + Deep Water) of 2 Mb/d. This plateau is maintained up to 2016 with Deep Water topping 1.6 Mb/d; at this time depletion sets in at 9% per annum, a characteristic figure for this kind of reservoirs.
Figure 4 – Angola Oil Production forecast. Click to enlarge.
It is likely that with rising oil prices countries like Angola start feeling pressure from consuming countries to increase their production. Hence a quota hike or even an unilateral move to break the 2 Mb/d plateau remain open possibilities. In such case an earlier peak and unfolding decline are to be expected.
Cabinda
Much of the Regular Oil produced in Angola still comes from Cabinda, and in spite of having just two concession blocks in its sea, it is also from here that the lion share of Angola's Deep Water production is coming. Hard figures don't seem to be available but at least two thirds of Angola's present oil output are coming from Cabinda.
Cabinda is a short piece of land north of the Congo River, cut of from the main territory in 1885. Early in the 1960s several independence groups joined to form FLEC. In the summer of 1975 FLEC created a provisional government and declared independence from Portugal. Early in 1976 MPLA (aided by Cuban troops) invaded the territory, gaining control of the territory and pushing FLEC to a guerilla war. FLEC would receive help from UNITA years later, but struggle inside the movement between different idealogical veins would break it apart in several organizations.
In the 1990s with the first peace agreements in Angola's mainland, it became clear that the independence of Cabinda wasn't a priority. FLEC reorganized, with FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-Renewed) congregating the political arm and FLEC-FAC (FLEC-Cabinda Armed Forces) the military, that continued the armed actions. After the death of Jonas Savimbi the Angolan Armed Forces concentrated in Cabinda, dwarfing FLEC's power. FLEC turned into kidnapping actions that cost them much of the already dwindling international support. In 2006 peace was settled between FLEC-Renovada and the MPLA's government, a move that wasn't followed by FLEC-FAC, casting doubts over its legitimacy.
The present situation in Cabinda was assessed by Jeff Vail here. An example of the current restless felt in the territory happened weeks ago when Isaías Samakuva (the present leader of UNITA) visited Cabinda [portuguese]. While discoursing Samakuva referenced peace as a fundamental instrument of development in Angola, the crowd answered claiming “Cabinda is at war!”.
At the moment FLEC-FAC doesn't seem to have visible armed power; actions are sporadic and so far haven't targeted oil facilities. The heavy military presence of Angolan troops (that has fostered the nationalist sentiment among civilians) allied to FLEC-FAC's international isolation makes it unlikely for a more serious situation to develop (e.g. similar to that in Nigeria).
As seen from the megaprojects list above, Cabinda is loosing its importance in Angola's oil production. With elections months way a policy change towards the territory might take place if the political balance in mainland Angola turns more into UNITA's side. But in the end it all comes down to social equity, if the Cabindese people come to feel that Oil exploration is bringing them development and its wealth not ending in Luanda's elites, the situation will likely improve.
Consumption
Angola's population presently stands at around 17 million and has been growing around 3% yearly. According to the UN's forecast the country is still far from completing its population transition and this growth rate should endure for some decades. By 2020 the country is forecast to have 24 million people and reach 30 million by 2030.
Figure 5 – Angola Population forecast, according to UN's forecast.
Data on Angola's energy consumption is scarce, the only institution keeping record of it seems to be the EIA. The country profiles database indicates very low values, which although cannot be cross check with other datasets, shouldn't be far from the truth.
Figure 6 – Past Angola Oil Consumption per capita.
These are very low numbers, about one fourth of the world's average in 2006. Demand was erratic until 2000, but with the onset of deep water exploration and the country's political stabilization, things started to improve. Although erratic, growth averaged 9% per annum from 2000 to 2005, it was almost 10% in 2006 and about 9% again in 2007. With international companies entering the country's service sector and economic development reaching other regions outside Luanda, this high rate of growth should continue for some time.
The internal oil demand forecast for Angola is as follows: consumption per capita should continue to grow along present lines, until about 2015 when depletion should start being a concern. From then onwards consumption growth per capita starts easing, reaching the world average only after 2020 and stabilizing around 6 b/cap/a by 2030 (a comparable figure with 3.6 b/cap/a today in Namibia and 8.5 b/cap/a in South Africa).
Figure 7 – Angola Oil Consumption per capita forecast.
Combining this forecast with UN's population figures results in a rapid growth of internal demand, topping 200 kb/d before 2020 and approaching 500 kb/d by 2030.
Figure 8 – Angola Oil Consumption forecast.
How likely is this forecast? The main driver of consumption is population growth itself, hence it relies heavily on UN's figures. By 2030 this forecast projects Angola almost doubling its population and becoming one of the wealthiest nations of the region, similar to South Africa today. Such an outcome is indeed possible, Oil is not the only economic activity in Angola, with Diamond extraction and Fisheries already important sectors and Agriculture having considerable potential. The main issue for the country is how to grow in an equitable fashion, an enduring problem in many oil production nations (especially in Africa). Above everything else, social inequity could be the determining factor undermining the foundations of this possible growth.
The Macroscopic View
In spite of the strong consumption growth and declining production forecast, Angola remains as a net oil exporter for many years to come, presenting a surplus up to the end of the period considered.
Figure 9 – Angola Oil Exports forecast. Click to enlarge.
Adding this forecast to the previously assessed countries yields no major changes, except for higher yearly totals. Peak continues to stand in 2005, with a gentle decline forming, that by 2011 starts accelerating.
Figure 10 – World Oil Exports as of June 2008. Click to enlarge.
Previous numbers of WOE:
WOE [00] Introduction
Luís de Sousa
The Oil Drum : Europe
I would doubt that 30% growth in GDP annually is going to be a good thing for this country.
Where did you got that figure? Why would it be bad?
Very top of the article:
In my opinion, this growth rate is just plain reckless, and it is doubtful the Angolans, as history has exhibited in many other African countries, will spend that newfound oil money on sustainable economic policies. This new oil money will just fuel internal consumption for food exports and modern goods ect, and result in more and more modern lives that will be born dependent upon fossil fuels for their livelihoods. It is akin to yeast in a jar getting a boost in their growth medium, which will result in an intensification of the overshoot/die-off cycle. In my opinion we should be questioning growth as being something universally good for societies, and seeing it as something that will make us more dependent upon a system relying on increasing complexity and depleting fossil fuels to solve its problems. Increasing complexity, like the transition from horses to cars for transportations requires exponentially more infrastructure to implement and as will some green fantasy to ultra high tech hybrid cars which requires even more infrastructure. Few people seem to think of this background issue which is exponentially increasing dependencies on infrastructure to accomplish our the same simple task which requires exponentially more energy. The net energy cliff is on us in my opinion and a technological fix will further exacerbate our decent, a fundamental change in socialization is what we need similar to what Jeff Vail speaks of. That's why I don't see a 30% growth in GDP based on it's people making it a golden part of Africa, long term, but setting it up for a tremendous amount of difficulties.
Read Joseph Tainter's, The Collapse of Complex Societies, It explains this issue in greater detail
-Crews
That was a good one. Check the GDP growth rate here. I don't know how the 30% figure ended there.
haha yes, that would mean angolas GDP would double every 2 years, looked kinda funny too me. Thanks
They should get Norwegian advisors. (No, not the oil fund, the intersting part is that they did not let the oil incomes ruin the rest of their economy and invests in long lasting infrastrucure and knowledge. )
They should get non-corrupt politicians and civil servants + working judiciary and police system. Besides, Norwegian Oil & Energy Company Norsk-Hydro of Norway has already been accused of corruption in Angola, so I doubt that advice from would help a lot.
Advice doesn't help, when politicians and oil company figures can get away with corruption routinely. Those guys already have the best advise: embezzle the money, put it in an account of a money laundering bank on Jersey and with the leftovers fund expansions in oil production, so you can steal more the next year.
Angola was at rank 147 out of 179 countries in the Transparency international 2007 Corruption Index rankings. If you think corruption in China is bad, it ranks at 70.
Global Witness wrote a whole report on corruption in Oil & Gas industry (both NOC and IOC) and it's a sad read (2004). CorpWatch also details how Angola oil deals are opaque and often involve shady arms deals that break various laws and regulations.
And as has been written in another thread, it is really difficult to fight corruption, when western banks work in collusion with the corrupt politicians. Banks in Switzerland and Jersey have been guilty of this and the practice continues.
On top of this, western investors are fighting over the rights to pour money into oil investments in Angola, usually caring very little for laws or ethics. The practice is easy, because World Bank has rated Angola as one of the most difficult places to do business, due to rampant cronyism and corruption.
What about the people? 70% of them live in abject absolute poverty (less than $1/day) and the rest who are not corrupt, mostly in very poor conditions. Oil sector is responsible for destroying much of the livelihood of fishermen in Cabinda, one of the poorest provinces.
It has been said many times and tons has been written about it, but let's say it again:
African oil producing nations are very unlikely to get out of poverty, until IOCs clean up their act, foreign banks stop laundering embezzled money, US/Switzerland/China/etc stop selling them arms and everybody imposes strict requirements on the government from the outside (trade/development/etc). It would probably take another 10 years to flush the system even semi-clean, but the lure of black gold is impossible to resist.
Random Wiki tidbits:
The current government has announced an intention to hold elections in 2009. These elections would be the first since 1992 and would serve to elect both a new president and a new National Assembly.
The country is the second-largest petroleum and diamond producer in sub-Saharan Africa, yet its people are among the continent's poorest.
Many African states have developed this tendency post-colonialism:
The concept of a gatekeeper state was introduced by the African historian Frederick Cooper in his book Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present.
According to Cooper, African governments suffer from a peculiar politico-economic dysfunction that derives from a particular historical sequence. Specifically, he contends "Africa was systematically conquered but not so systematically ruled" (2002: 196-197) and hence "colonial states had been gate-keeper states" (ibid.: 5) which had "trouble extending their power and their command of people’s respect... inward" (ibid.: 156) but could control "the interface of national and world economies" (ibid.: 141). The colonial powers wanted specific things from Africa (e.g. natural resources) and hence had only a limited transformational agenda since extraction could occur in the absence of a strong state. Ultimately, the authority of colonial regimes depended on the superior military forces of the metropole, which could easily defeat organised resistance but could neither routinise authority nor gain legitimacy (ibid.: 157). The survival of each colony therefore depended on external resources and support, not on internal factors like in established states. As a result, colonial governments had weak roots in the African countries nominally under their control and therefore could not really govern the social or cultural realms of their subjects. In turn, this external dependence produced an outward orientation focused on ‘guarding the gate’: colonies collected most of their revenues from taxes on imports and exports, controlled entry and exit visas, distributed foreign aid, decided who could move currency in or out, and issued licenses that determined who could engage in business activities (ibid.: 5, 97, 157).
The post-colonial "successor states," Cooper goes on to argue, inherited the mantle of gate-keeper from their former rulers. Independence, however, greatly exacerbated the negative consequences of gate-keeping because whereas before it was taken for granted who would control the gate (along with the power and wealth derived therefrom), in the post-colonial period there was no external military force to impose order. Furthermore, unlike the colonial powers (at least before the "development era" after about 1940) African rulers wanted to impose their authority internally in order to affect a far-reaching transformation of the economy and society. And given, moreover, that control of the gate was an "either/or phenomenon" (ibid.: 159) or a zero-sum game, the stakes of control were extremely high because the winners gained control of resources they could use to entrench their rule. Consequently fierce competition for control of the gate arose soon after independence, and this resulted in the collectively irrational political instablitity that occurred in Africa after independence as evidenced by, among other things, cycles of coups and counter coups.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gatekeeper_state
Hate to be critical, but the future-prospects part at the end was wanting. I would suggest for TOD to get someone versed in political-economy to maybe contribute a little bit to relevant articles. I could be available (if wanted) maybe the mods could help facilitate the connection with the relevant parties. (provide them with my email, if its not on display--IDK).
I’m not quite sure what you mean by ‘versed in political economy’. I hope you don’t mean to include the pundits who write for ‘The Economist’ and who, some 30 years ago, predicted that Mugabe would bring peace and prosperity to Zimbabwe, or who ten years ago predicted that South Africa would become an ‘African success story’, or who can’t write an essay on any African country without including the expression ‘sliver of hope’.
My hunch is that the more ‘versed’ people are in political economy the more bullshit they are likely to spatter about. If you want to know more about Africa, ask somebody who has lived there.
From ‘The Economist’, 8 May 1980:
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&s...
No, someone 'versed' would have thought the opposite; I thought that was rather clear.
I am also doubtful of Angola's future prospects. Nigeria demonstrates just how bad things can get when a state becomes highly dependent on natural resource revenue. From a political economy perspective, government dependence on oil revenue can lead to a lot of negative structural impacts, especially in the context of Africa, its history, and current state. Rising oil production engendered much hope and expectation for positive change in Nigeria. None of it panned out.
See also the "resource curse" thesis. In a nutshell: Resource rich countries exhibit a startling trend toward economic underdevelopment. Countries whose economies are largely dependant on the extraction and production of primary resources suffer from domestic strife and conflict, poverty, authoritarian rule, and flaccid economic growth. Resource dependence leads to the "rentier state," in which those in power come to depend on rents from resource extraction rather than taxation, making them less accountable to their people.
Ross, Michael. "The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor." Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ed. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003. 17-42.
Collier, Paul. "Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation and Policy Interventions." Oxford University and the World Bank (2003).
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International Development (1997).
One again, no comments on why any of these theories apply differently to Africa, than say post-colonial Asia. Isn't the Daqing oil field in China, at 16 gigabarrels, larger than any found in sub-saharan africa? Am I the only person that sees a contradiction in statements like: "America was able to dominate the world in the early 20th century because of its ample natural resources, especially oil, of which it had one of the world's largest endowments.", and "Africa is poor because of its ample natural resource, especially oil."
The explanation for that disconnect lies in historical context. The statement that "America was able to dominate the world in the early 20th century because of its ample natural resources, especially oil, of which it had one of the world's largest endowments," isn't incorrect, but its only one piece of the puzzle, there are a lot of other reasons why the US became so dominant in the 20th century. The United States has a very different post-colonial history than say, Nigeria. The US gained independence, and went through massive stages of industrialization, migration, and expansion, all the while being free to exploit the people and natural resources of an nearly an entire continent. American history, especially westward expansion, is characterized by the kind of conflict, strife, and instability that the resource curse thesis attempts to explain. One could frame it as the resource-poor original 13 colonies dominating the resource rich interior. History is full of examples like this, such as 19th - early 20th century Japan, and the Netherlands in the 17th century. The United States never suffered from a resource curse, however Native Americans did. Africa's colonial and post-colonial history is a completely different story, as is Asia's. The resource curse thesis doesn't apply differently to America, Africa or Asia. It's really an observable phenomenon, you just need to go a little deeper to see how it plays out in the real world.
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. Ed. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier. Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2003.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/05/24...
Thanks for posting the link, I'd used a few articles from that for a research paper awhile ago. Some good stuff in there.
Don't we all hope that this one country, Angola with its rich supply of natural resources, oil, can somehow be a shining star on a continent that seems to have nothing but trouble. Is it possible for an African country to build an infrastructure equal to the developed world? Can their people live in prosperity and share its natural wealth across all socio-economic levels? No, but its a nice dream isn't it? Angola, the shining star of Africa...
The days of Colonial rule were it's golden days. The African people have neither the will nor sense to govern themselves. We gave them Education, Military, Social, and political education yet once we left the continent decended back into the quagmire it is now.
The Continent should be one of the most rich and prosperous on the planet due to it's geological wealth, and it's potential to be a world tourist destination is, i think, immense. Unfortunately the people cannot see past their tribalism.
Getting on topic though, maybe, just maybe Angola can set an example in how to effictively use it's new wealth to drag itself out of the dark ages.
Sadly accepted,
Marco.
Above should be deleted for racism.
The comment is not in any way racist.
Then you must be completely unaware of that whole colonialism bit; and probably shouldn't post amidst such ignorance.
I am well aware. Howevever they should have continued our legacy in the 4 disciplines mentioned above, after independence.
Read my long comment above.
OK I read it and I agree that the effects of collonialism created a starnge economic, political and social rule that (because it only needed to be satble enough to allow extraction of resource during colonial rule) was doomed to failure - thats what i understand from the text.
However this does not invalidate my initial statement that they have neither the will nor sense to change. And neither does it mean that the four things we gave them were necassarily bad for them at the time. We just did not give them a complete set of values/systems by which to run a continent.
Marco.
Well, we will never know what could have been, fact is, any bonafide development post-colonialism first has to address the thus accrued contradictions.
"We gave them Education, Military, Social, and political education"
This isn't saying much. I'm not so sure 'we' gave them an education. 'We' did, however, give them any and all military aid they wanted; I don't know about you, but I see this as counter-productive. Social/Political education? Really? Come on? Where are these universities? I believe a great many African dictators were given the finest Western education money could buy, not that it ever did their country any good.
The continents' problems are only perpetuated by these legacy politico-economic conditions, which are in turn, symbiotic with the most important of all: brain drain.
The Portuguese, just like all the other Europeans, were there to thieve anything which was not nailed down, not to impart any values except such as were advantageous to their imperial policy.
I agree. The comment above from Marco is ignorant and wrong.
What is your point? It could be argued that no country exercises it's foreign policy to benefit another nation other than itself. Aid programmes for example only ever amount to a tiny fraction of a % of total GDP of a donating country so it could be argued that this is no more than showing political face.
You are correct in that their reasons were ultimately selfish but has that changed today?
Marco.
I've never understood how Africa gets a total pass on everything because 50 years ago they were colonized. How is it the Asian countries were able to overcome their colonial baggage so quickly. Are you suggesting that the French in vietnam were somehow not extractive occupiers, or where loved by the vietnamese. How about the British in China (see Opium wars). It's also interesting that to blame the African peoples or government in any way for their lack of development/infrastructure is to be immediately equated with racists. But I guess 5o yrs isn't so bad, blacks in America have been hiding behind slavery for their lack of performance for 3 times that long. Here's to improvment in the 22nd century...
I do hope that the moderators of this site flag this post and permanently ban you from posting here. You sir are a blatant racist of the most vile kind. The only improvement people like you can provide is when you choke to death on your own bile.
Magyar, congratulations, your statement proves my point that anyone who doesn't drink your version of the cool-aid must be a racist fit only for death. I never thought about it, but I guess the underperformance of Spain versus Britain economically over the last 500 years could in fact be due to their longer and more brutal experience with colonization under the Romans 2000 years ago. Wow, I stand corrected, colonialism explains everything. I wonder if it's too late for Spain to petition the EU for reparations from Italy. Quick, call the thought police before I speak again. I will not stoop to your level, and will refrain, sir, from labeling you a blatant fascist.
Nor sir will I! I also find rather sad that so few of the people here reading you comment are not as outraged as am I. So let me say it loud and clear in your face YOU ARE A RACIST!
Get some grip. I didn't see any racism in his comments, only a diatribe about african leadership incompetence. And except his starting phrase The days of Colonial rule were it's golden days. which wasn't very bright, though I do understand what he means, he's not that far off. Angola's leaders are corrupt to the core, and the elites are willing to cope with it because they are getting richer. The poor will remain poor and uneducated because no one cares about them. Fact remains: Angola's houses range from the richest of the world to the poorest of the world, and they don't seem to give a damn.
It doesn't require one to have a racist mind that such path isn't going to take them very far away.
Perhaps one has to live in the United States to think this is a racist statement then? Maybe it is you who needs to get a more broad perspective. Trust me when I tell you this is about as racist as it gets. In the US you would not be able to say this and not get slammed for it. He isn't talking about Angola and as someone who was raised in Brazil I have a very good understanding of third world corruption and elitism. This is not about that, I quote the statement that has me in an uproar, again!
Maybe your comprehension of the Anglo Saxon vernacular and the cultural nuances of the American variety are somewhat lacking. What part of this statement do you not understand or do not consider racist? Please do elucidate as to how that is not a racist statement.
(Magyar)
Fly away little bird. Back to your gilded cage were the ills of the world are all caused by the white man, or the Americans, or the "West", and anyone who dares say otherwise is a racist or worse. What a wonderful opiate, to not be account