The Month of the Psychological Shock (Over Oil) in America?

In a country largely turned into itself, a lone journalist tries to bring reality on oil prices above the daily roll of news bits on football results, jet-set gossip and political fait-divers.

On the 24th of May Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues published on the newspaper Expresso (the largest weekly publication in Portugal with 120 000 printings) what is one of the most direct addresses of Peak Oil ever featured in Portuguese media. Apparently written about the US this article is replete with messages for internal consumption.

Crossposted at the European Tribune.

O mês do choque psicológico na América

The month of the psychological shock in America

Três factos provocaram um primeiro safanão no cidadão americano: o preço do galão de gasolina, um documentário dramático da CNN e um aviso sobre um relatório que só sairá em Novembro. Three facts gave the first shake up on the American citizen: the price of a gallon of gasoline, a dramatic documentary on CNN and a warning on a report that will come out only in November.
O mês de Maio de 2008 vai ficar na história do cidadão comum americano como o momento do choque psicológico. Finalmente, o americano da rua deu-se conta - na bomba da gasolina, no sofá em frente da TV e na primeira página do seu mais importante jornal - que a era do petróleo barato acabou mesmo. The month of May of 2008 will remain in the history of the common American citizen has the moment of the psychological shock. Finally, the American in the street has perceived - at the filling station, on the couch in front of the TV and in the first page of his most important newspaper - that the age of cheap oil is really over.
Na bomba de gasolina, o automobilista americano surpreendeu-se com o galão (não confundir com o café com leite) a chegar aos 4 dólares e começou a entrar em pânico (apesar de, ao câmbio actual, ser, ainda, menos de metade do preço do litro em Portugal!). Pela primeira vez, começou a perceber que o impacto real do barril de crude acima dos 100 dólares (barreira que foi ultrapassada em Fevereiro deste ano) também lhe toca. At the filling station, the American driver was surprised by the gallon (not to confuse with coffee with milk [in Portuguese the word gallon has this alternative meaning]) reaching the price of 4 dollars and started panicking (in spite of, at the current exchange rate, being still half of the price in Portugal!). For the first he started to understand that the real impact of a barrel of oil over 100 dollars (barrier overcome in February of this year) also touches him.
Bush veio de mãos a abanar.



Bush came back empty handed.

Mustafa Kamal /EPA
CNN assusta com "Out of Gas"

A CNN passou um documentário de choque intitulado "Out of Gas" ficcionando uma crise dramática, económica, social e geopolítica, para o final de 2009, uma prenda envenenada para o próximo inquilino da Casa Branca. A poderosa estação televisiva abraçou o ponto de vista de que a alta do preço do barril tem razões estruturais (o famoso "pico da produção do petróleo" e a mudança na cena geopolítica com o fim provável do estatuto de "hegemonista sozinho" dos EUA) e não meramente conjunturais (sejam elas, acontecimentos fortuitos que sempre ocorrerão, como aconteceu agora com o terramoto na China, ou a "bolha" de especulação financeira nas "commodities").

CNN scares with "Out of Gas"

CNN broadcast a shock documentary entitled "Out of Gas" staging a dramatic crisis, economic, social and geo-political, by the end of 2009, a poisoned gift for the next White House lodger. The eminent broadcaster embraced the viewpoint that the high barrel prices have structural reasons (the famous "peak of oil production" and the change in the geopolitic scene with the likely end of the "lone hegemonist" status of the USA) and not merely circumstantial (might they be, fortuitous events that will always take place, as the earthquake that just happened in China, or the financial speculative "bubble" in commodities).

O diário 'Wall Street Journal' divulgou que a Agência Internacional de Energia irá rever, em Novembro, os seus prognósticos sobre a oferta futura de petróleo, especulando que a revisão será em baixa - o aumento progressivo de produção estimado estará muito abaixo de atingir o patamar dos 116 milhões de barris diários em 2030 (actualmente está nos 87). Ou seja, a agência embarcou, também, na corrente "pessimista", comenta o jornal. Apesar do "rascunho" do relatório ainda estar a ser teclado nos computadores com base na investigação nos 400 campos petrolíferos existentes, o efeito das suas prováveis conclusões estatísticas fez já tremer tanto os "traders" como o leitor mais ligado a estes temas. The daily paper "Wall Street Journal" revealed that the International Energy Agency will revise, in November, their forecasts on the future oil supply, speculating that the revision will be downwards - the progressive production growth foreseen will be far from reaching the [previous] threshold of 116 million barrels per day (presently at 87). In other words, the agency also embarked in the "pessimistic" current, the newspaper comments. Although the "draft" of the report is still being typed in computers, based on research on 400 existing oil fields, the effect of its probable statistic conclusions is already shaking traders and readers knowledgeable on these issues.
Mercado de futuros atacado pelo vírus do "contango"

O mês de Maio tem visto os noticiários televisivos e as manchetes "online" repetir diariamente que os "máximos históricos" foram ultrapassados, o que, de tanto ser repetido, já é uma banalidade.
Futures market attacked by the contango virus

The month of May has seen TV news programs and on-line headlines repeating daily that "record highs" have been surpassed, which, by so much repeating, is now a banality.

O acaso, ainda por cima, resolveu dar um empurrão negativo - o terramoto na China ocorreu numa região (Sichuan) que produz 22% do gás natural e que detém imensas barragens e estações eléctricas (396) e minas de carvão (no conjunto de Sichuan, Chongquing e Gansu há 22 minas importantes). Tudo está paralisado. To make things worse, fortune resolved to give a negative push - the earthquake in China in a region (Sichuan) that produces 22% of the [country's] natural gas and that holds a vast number of dams and electric stations (396) and coal mines (on the whole of Sichuan, Chongquing and Gansu there are 22 important mines). All is paralyzed.
Estima-se que, para além dos Jogos Olímpicos de Beijing, o efeito acumulado com esta paragem forçada provocada pelo terramoto naquelas regiões obrigará a um aumento excepcional da procura chinesa de crude. A situação é ainda mais dramática no campo dos destilados - o aumento da procura de gasóleo por parte da China deverá disparar justamente numa altura em que os "stocks" deste destilado são escassos face à procura, particularmente na Europa e na Ásia, alertou, esta semana, a Associação para o Estudo do Pico do Petróleo e do Gás (ASPO) dos Estados Unidos. It is estimated that, beyond the Beijing Olympic Games, the cumulative effect of this stall imposed by the earthquake in those regions will result in a exceptional increase of the Chinese demand for crude oil. The situation is even more dramatic for distillates - the increase in demand of diesel in China should shot up exactly in a time when stocks of this distillate are scarce to fulfil demand, particularly in Europe and Asia, alerted this week the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) of the United States.
A questão fundamental é que o petróleo - como "commodity" não renovável que é - entrou desde 1999 numa nova fase da sua formação de preço, em que os constrangimentos estruturais da oferta determinarão que se comporte como um mercado liderado pelos vendedores (que poderão reforçar o seu papel de cartel) em que estes terão condições de impor os seus preços e as suas estratégias... até que a "commodity" em causa deixe de ser crítica em termos de consumo (nomeadamente para todo o sistema mundial de transportes). The fundamental question is that oil - as a non renewable commodity - entered in 1999 in a new phase of its price formation, in which structural supply constraints will determine the behaviour of a market leaded by sellers (that could re-enforce their role as a cartel) where they will have the power of imposing their prices and their strategies... until the commodity at cause stops being critic in consumption terms (namely for the whole world transport system).
Tudo indica que o preço do barril se consolidará no patamar dos 130 dólares durante o próximo mês e que a barreira dos 150 dólares poderá ser galgada no segundo semestre deste ano. A Goldman Sachs vaticinou, como média, 135 dólares no terceiro trimestre e 145 no último trimestre de 2008. All things considered, the price of a barrel of oil should consolidate its new grounds at 130 dollars during the next month and the 150 dollar threshold should be tackled in the second semester of this year. Goldman Sachs predicted, on average, 135 dollars for the third quarter and 145 in the last quarter of 2008.
Convém, o leitor ter em conta que o comportamento do preço desta mercadoria é oscilante - sobe de um modo "não linear", ou seja parece-se com um io-iô. O facto de estar hoje nos 130 dólares não significa que nas próximas semanas não possa descer, para depois retomar o patamar anterior, e disparar para cima. Tendo triplicado de preço nos últimos cinco anos, o preço do barril poderá continuar a ter uma subida de longo prazo similar, com várias oscilações mais ou menos pronunciadas. The reader should be aware that the price of this commodity behaves on an oscillating fashion - rises in a "non linear" way, meaning it is like a yo-yo. The fact it is today at 130 dollars doesn't mean that during the next weeks it can't go down, to later climb to the previous plateau and shot up higher. Having tripled during the last five years, the price of a barrel should continue to have a similar long term rise, with several oscillations more or less pronounced.
Provavelmente mais técnico - e por isso menos óbvio para o leitor comum - é o facto do preço no mercado de futuros do crude ter entrado numa dinâmica de "contango" (uma corrupção dos termos continuação e contingência, um palavrão técnico inventado no século XIX em Inglaterra), ou seja, apresenta preços progressivamente mais altos do que os no mercado de entrega imediata (chamado de "spot"). O que significa que os "traders" já interiorizaram que o disparo dos preços veio para ficar. Possibly more technical - and therefore less obvious for the common reader - is the fact that crude prices in the futures markets have shifted to a dynamic of "contango" (a corruptive form of the terms continuity and contingency, a technical word invented in the XIX century in England), meaning, it presents higher prices that those at the market ready for immediate delivery (called "spot"). That means that traders have already perceived that price rises have come to stay.
O petróleo não vai nascer para todos

Apesar do marketing intenso (para efeitos de valorizações bolsistas ou ganhos de posição geopolítica) em torno de muitas novas descobertas de reservas petrolíferas, a questão crítica é a sua extracção, produção e destilação rentáveis. E, sobretudo, o seu efeito liquido na oferta global (ou seja, à medida que alguns são descobertos ou iniciam exploração, muitos outros poços vão ficando esgotados - o que conta é o saldo).

Oil will not rise for all

Although the intensive marketing (for effects of stock market gains or geopolitical positioning) around many new discoveries of oil reserves, the critical question is its commercial extraction, production and refining. And, above all, its net effect on global demand (as new reservoirs are discovered or start production, many other are becoming depleted - what matters is the balance).

Diversos estudos apontam para um facto incontornável - o pico de produção do petróleo poderá ocorrer antes de 2010 e, segundo as previsões mais optimistas, até 2025. A aproximação deste tecto provoca uma escalada altista, facto histórico já observável nos ciclos de outras "commodities" não-renováveis. O investigador Ugo Bardi, da Universidade de Florença, demonstrou um comportamento similar para o caso do óleo de baleia no século XIX. Several studies point to an unavoidable fact - the peak of world oil production can occur before 2010 and, according to the most optimistic forecasts, until 2025. The approach to this ceiling fosters a rise spiral, historical fact previously observed in cycles of other non-renewable commodities. The researcher Ugo Bardi, from the Florence University, has shown a similar behaviour in the case of whale oil in the XIX century.
O que o pico significa é que, numa fase imediatamente seguinte, a produção não chegará para o aumento muito superior da procura, até que o efeito dos preços altos contraia drasticamente a própria procura. Um "equilíbrio" entre oferta e procura será atingido - mas a um nível muito mais baixo, e sem que o preço da "commodity" baixe significativamente. O que é que isto significa? Que não haverá petróleo para todos e que não serão muitos os que terão dinheiro para o pagar! What the peak means is that, during an immediate following stage, production will not reach the much faster increase of demand, until the effect of high prices drastically contracts demand itself. An "equilibrium" between supply and demand will be met - but a at much lower level, and without a significant fall of the commodity's price. What does this mean? That oil will not be enough for all and not many will have the money to pay for it!
Não será de estranhar, por isso, que se generalize, nesta fase de ocaso, a prática da troca directa de petróleo por outros produtos sem intervenção de divisas - o que tecnicamente se chama de "barter", uma prática comercial típica de mercados com "rigidez" e em épocas de hiperinflação ou desvalorizações massivas. So it shouldn't be strange during this foreclosing stage a generalization of direct trade of oil for other goods, without the intervention of currency - what is technically named "barter", a commercial practice typical of "rigid" markets and during times of massive hyperinflation or devaluation.
O americano da rua deu-se conta que a era do petróleo barato acabou mesmo.



The American on the street realized that the cheap oil age is really over.

Don Ryan/AP
Ilusões de "intervenção" política

O mês de Maio assistiu nos Estados Unidos ao "ensaio" geral de todos os argumentos sobre a forma do poder político "intervir" na situação.
Illusions of political "intervention"

The month of May assisted in the United States to the "rehearsal" of all arguments on the way of politic power to "intervene" in the situation.

A Administração Bush foi ao Médio Oriente ver se "extraía" mais petróleo. Mas, em troca, recebeu uma promessa sem grande impacto (300 mil barris por dia da parte da Arábia Saudita), e uma contra-resposta do cartel dos produtores: de que a culpa era dos especuladores financeiros e da imposição de impostos elevados sobre os destilados pelos países consumidores. The Bush Administration went to the Middle East trying to "extract" more oil. But in return received a promise with little impact (300 thousand barrels per day from Saudi Arabia), and a counter-answer from the producers' cartel: that to blame are financial speculators and the high taxes imposed on refined products by consuming countries.
O cartel da OPEP não quer admitir publicamente que a sua galinha dos ovos de ouro atingiu um tecto e que, por isso, terá de gerir o que resta de um modo muito apertado. A intervenção militar para "regular" o assunto, também se mostra muito cara financeira e geopoliticamente (vide caso do Iraque), e sem grande impacto na oferta. Uma intervenção mais "soft", através da Organização Mundial do Comércio pressionando o cartel, esbarra com lacunas legais e dúvidas de eficácia. The OPEC cartel won't admit publicly that its golden eggs chicken has reached a ceiling and that it will have to manage what's left in a tight manner. The military intervention to "regulate" the issue has also shown very costly financially as geo-politically (e.g. Iraq's case) and without much impact on supply. A softer intervention through the World Trade Organization pressuring the cartel, stands against on legal holes e efficacy doubts.
Restam, por isso, os outros argumentos "domésticos" de emergência, muito esgrimidos na contenda das primárias das presidenciais norte-americanas. Therefore remain the other emergency "domestic" arguments, heavily exchanged in the primaries race for the presidential elections.
O efeito da especulação financeira é inferior a 15% do preço actual. E, mesmo que parasse, o impacto em baixa seria transitório, refere o investigador Pedro de Almeida, 49 anos, especialista nos mercados financeiros e de "commodities", professor na Universidade da Beira Interior. Mais: "Quaisquer medidas que se tomem contra os ditos especuladores financeiros apenas tenderão a reduzir a liquidez dos mercados mundiais de crude, limitando as possibilidades de utilização desses mercados para que os produtores e consumidores efectivos façam os seus negócios em boas condições", sublinha o investigador e consultor. Acresce, ainda, que face à tendência de declínio das bolsas e à desvalorização do dólar, os investidores encontram nas "commodities" uma zona de refúgio - é uma "lei de ferro" da finança. Não há política "voluntarista" que lhe valha. The effect of financial speculation is inferior to 15% of the actual price. And, even if it stooped, the downward impact would be transitory, says the researcher Pedro de Almeida, 49 years old, specialist in financial and commodities markets and professor at the Beira Interior University [Covilhã, Portugal]. More: "Any measures taken against the so called financial speculators will only tend to reduce the liquidity of the world's crude markets, limiting the possibilities of using those markets for the effective producers and consumers to do business in good conditions", underlines the researcher and consultant. Over that there's the tendency, in face of stock markets decline and dollar devaluation, for the investors to take refuge on commodities - an "iron law" of finance. There's no "voluntary" politics to help.
Devido à pressão política no Congresso dos Estados Unidos, a Administração Bush travou os fornecimentos adicionais de crude para a Reserva Estratégica de Petróleo dos Estados Unidos. Uma medida que não tem impacto significativo nos preços (como se está a observar), servindo apenas para "desdramatizar" a situação. E que poderá ser um erro estratégico desguarnecendo uma reserva que poderá ser vital para os EUA. Attending the politic pressure from Congress the Bush Administration stopped the additional supplies to Strategic Petroleum Reserve. A measure that has no significant impact on prices (as can be observed) taken solely to "de-dramatize" the situation. And that could be a strategic error degarnishing a reserve that could be vital for the US.
Finalmente, o discurso dos impostos sobre os combustíveis. Jack Nilles, o "pai" do teletrabalho, foi dos poucos gurus americanos que teve a coragem de ir contra a corrente, e de fazer uma afirmação politicamente incorrecta. Afirmou explicitamente que realizar uma isenção populista de impostos na gasolina, durante as férias por exemplo, é um erro estratégico que só atrasa o necessário incentivo à reconversão urgente (e inevitável) do sistema de transportes norte-americano. Pedro de Almeida, por seu lado, refere: "Os Estados Unidos terão dificuldade em reduzir ainda mais os impostos numa conjuntura de défices públicos. São ideias que passam bem nos votantes, mas só defensáveis por políticos inconscientes, que comprometerão ainda mais a evolução futura da economia americana". Finally, the speech of fuel taxes. Jack Nilles, the "father" of telecommuting, was one of the few American gurus to have the courage to go against the flow, making a politically incorrect address. He affirmed explicitly that proceeding with a populist exemption on gasoline taxes, during holidays for instance, is a strategic mistake that only delays the necessary incentive for the urgent (and inevitable) reconversion of the north-American transport system. Pedro de Almeida, in his turn adds: "The United States will have difficulties in reducing taxes even further, in face of public deficits. These are ideas, that go will with the electors, can only be put forward by unconscious politicians, that will compromise even more the future evolution of the American economy".
Paradoxalmente, é provável que uma reversão da política da Reserva Federal (FED) - que continua a insistir em manter taxas de juro negativas (ou seja, que empresta o dinheiro aos bancos a um juro muito inferior à inflação, obrigando os contribuintes a pagar esse subsídio encoberto à alta finança) - "trave", a partir de certo ponto, a espiral dos preços do petróleo. Luis de Sousa, outro especialista em petróleo, e membro da ASPO portuguesa, comenta: "Antes de se chegar a valores astronómicos do barril, é provável que haja uma intervenção monetária no sentido da que Paul Volcker [presidente da FED entre 1979 e 1987] fez em 1982". Paradoxically, it is probable that a reversion of the Federal Reserve (FED) politics - that insists in keeping negative interest rates (borrowing money to banks at a rate below inflation, forcing tax payers to pay that covert subsidy to the high finance) - stepping on the brakes, after a certain point, of the crude price spiral. Luís de Sousa, another oil specialist, and member of the Portuguese ASPO, comments: "Before reaching astronomic barrel prices it is probable that a monetary intervention takes place, in similar sense to that Paul Volcker (FED's president from 1979 to 1987) made in 1982".


Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues got a degree in Economics in the 1970s and started collaborating with Expresso in 1983, since then founding several magazines and e-zines. Beyond Expresso he also collaborates with the EuroAsia Journal of Management (in China) and is co-ordinator of the Revista Portuguesa e Brasileira de Gestão (Brasilian and Portuguese Management Magazine). Author of several books, he is also the editor of www.gurusonline.tv and www.janelanaweb.com.

A fair article. He misses one important point about exporters' oil production, though: that even if they can increase production, they might not want to. If you can sell 500,000 barrels a day for $100 each or 1 million barrels a day for $50 each, you'll be sensible to prefer the first, since your oil will not last forever, you may as well get as much money out of it as you can. The Middle Eastern exporters, at least, have few other resources and products they can export.

The only thing against this is that if oil is too scarce on the world market and expensive, it encourages people to conserve and look for alternatives. Saudi Arabia doesn't want Australia to stop using oil any more than Australia wants China to stop using coal, or the US wants Mexicans to stop eating corn, or Ghanans want the EU to stop drinking coffee.

So they must balance making the most money for the most time from their depleting resource against not encouraging their trade partners to conserve or seek alternatives. The current US, EU and Australian governments make this easy - we're not keen on the alternatives, we want to keep on truckin'. Which leads to the old and simple issue: if demand rises and supply can't, price rises. An issue which is a bit murky to the average economist, I know - but there you go.

“The only thing against this is that if oil is too scarce on the world market and expensive, it encourages people to conserve and look for alternatives. Saudi Arabia doesn't want Australia to stop using oil any more than Australia wants China to stop using coal, or the US wants Mexicans to stop eating corn, or Ghanans want the EU to stop drinking coffee. “ Posted by Kiashu

But maybe the exporters have finally realized that they have nothing to fear from “alternative energies.” If they are at or near Peak, the Saudis surely know that it will be absolutely impossible for wind and solar to be expanded on the enormous scale needed even to provide any substantial supply of electricity that still would be less than to-day’s output. I’m sure the Saudis are also aware of the general worthlessness of Ethanol and biofuels in general, and that most other technologies are either in the lab or extant only as a “demo”; thus, even under the most realistically optimistic scenarios several decades away from large scale commercial production. And other than biofuels, virtually all the alternative energies produce only electricity, which, while we will need all we can get, is not a liquid fuel especially convenient for transportation. So I think they realize that their oil will ALWAYS be in demand, and at ever higher prices; naturally they’d want to make the bonanza last as long as possible. And when supply gets REALLY tight, they can blame the producers of the alternative energies for failing to live up to whatever hype they have put out in their marketing campaigns.

Antoinetta III

I hope the Saudis and the Ibn Bush were smart enough to jack the price of oil up while there was still time to develop substitutes. It's really going to hurt if the reason prices are going up is because there really isn't any more oil.

Antoinetta III says,
"So I think they realize that their oil will ALWAYS be in demand, and at ever higher prices; naturally they’d want to make the bonanza last as long as possible."

Indeed oil will always be in demand, but how much oil? If we make the assumption that demand can go to 120 million barrels per day (and production can match that) by 2030 as the EIA of the U.S. Department of Energy and the NPC (National Petroleum Council) does, we must be assuming a massive increase in infrastructure in the oil E&P (Exploration and Production), refining and transporting sectors. Who is going to take the risk of footing that bill if they cannot be sure that the demand will indeed be there (remember, we are talking 22 years)? Recall that oil was pushed out of the electric power generation business in barely over a decade. It has been virtually pushed out of the home heating market in barely over that. Oil now has to rely on transportation demand to assure that it has a market, and if it can be pushed out of that market, or reduced to insignificance in the transportation sector, then the builders and investors of the giant infrastructure system built to increase production from 85 million barrels per day to 120 would potentially lose trillions (yes, trillions, using numbers provided by Matthew Simmons and others).

No one knows this better than the Saudi's, who are showing themselves not to be willing to make such a mammoth investment without some type of "demand assurance". They see batteries and plug hybrid technology racing ahead (I know technology is viewed as a joke by most TOD posters but the Saudi's take it seriously, after all, it made them what they are, a world power player), they see carbon limits being discussed and carbon taxes being proposed, and they see continents like Europe essentially declaring a quiet financial war on oil consumption.

In the meantime, the Americans are loathe to pay a bit extra per gallon to help fund the mammoth expenditure needed to raise oil production. All this is premised on the assumption that the oil is out there to produce, but really, it doesn't matter one way or the other if no one is willing to pay to produce it! Peak money long before peak oil...

For reference to Saudi public comments on the demand side issue, see the one key post I have written for TOD,
"A Tale of Two Speeches--OPEC's Demand Side Fear Is Very Real"
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2978

RC

RC, I'm going on the assumption that we are at or near peak and that the reason investment in exploration and drilling is low is because it is unlikely there are any large finds left. Certainly no one wants to invest in a bunch of dry holes, in oil that cannot be produced because it does not exist, at least not in any large, easily accessible agglomeration.

And I don't think many people feel that any combination of "renewable" or alternative energies can scale up at a rate fast enough to at least keep up with the ongoing declines in overall production.

So I see the Saudis and the other exporters with declining production continually exporting less and less, but at ever higher prices. This is the first part of Westexas' breakdown, where the exporters will still see increasing income in spite of declining exports. Westexas suggests a point where their exports will decline that the cash flow will also, but I suspect that this will come quite late in the game, if it does at all.

Actually, I suspect that we will blunder along as we have, with oil prices swing up and down, but mostly up, with shortages and crises cropping up more and more frequently and working up the worldwide economic food chain. I can see this continuing for 2-7 years; at some point in this timeframe it will become clear that we are not only post-peak, but a critical mass of the investor/financial world will realize that the 200+ years of more or less continuous economic growth is over, forever. Markets will crash and a worldwide depression would ensue. Oil might go to $5 bucks a barrel, but at that point it won't matter, as $5 then would likely be the equivalent of $500 now. And in seven, or even ten years time, there is nothing that alternative energies, electric cars, hybrids, etc. will be able to do avert any of this.

If the Saudis are afraid of electric cars, battery tech, hybrids, etc., then they are afraid of shadows.

Antoinetta III

I would have agreed with you even a month or two ago, but I'm starting to believe the effects on aggrigate oil demand shown recently will help us pull through the next 5 or so years until real alternative tech really becomes competitive and available. Truck and SUV sales have been shreaded, the airlines can't seem to lay people off fast enough, vehicle miles are declining even as public transportation ridership is rising tremendously fast, while small cars and particulaherly hybrid sales have exploded. Also developing countries are finally reconsidering their fuel subsidies, which is just as encouraging as US demand destruction.

But why should oil producing countries suppose that the price of oil is only to get higher?

If a depression happens (and it could at any moment) in my opinion oil has no limits (downwards).

There are many parallels with 1929. Which I find most striking - the upper 1% of people in USA has something like half of all capital again after 1929.

It seems logical: elite needs happy herds only to accumulate wealth. once accumulating wealth on the shoulders of middle class is not possible anyomore, why would elites bother about middle class?

and you can't get that much anyomore, when you already have everything

The price of oil might fall soon. After all, we can only buy oil with money we borrow. If we can't borrow money, we can't buy oil, we stop importing oil, 12 million barrels a day of demand vanishes from the oil market, and Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait all stop exporting oil!

that sounds realistic..

Oh yeah, we're just going to stop importing oil and teach those Saudi bitches a thing or two!! I can see them shaking in their bathrobes now. from laughter.

The last times that the elites failed to take account of the middle classes, they ended up having to deal with people like these:

Arras, Robspierre, Danton , Marat, Lenin, Trotsky...

The world consumed more oil in 1939 than it did in 1929. A depression may cause consumption to decline a little, for a while, but it is not clear that it will cause consumption to decline faster than depletion. In addition, some of the oil that is being produced now is very expensive to produce. As prices go down, that production will come off line. A depression is also likely to increase political instability, further depressing production, if it does not lead to outright warfare.

Surely that indicates that to depress oil depletion then you would need a greater depression than the 30's, as supply and demand are going to be equal.
Counteracting that though somewhat is that AFAIK oil did not get more expensive in the 30's, and so there was less incentive to conserve.

I think you correctly point out two parts of the price/transition equation, but perhaps all can't make the connection.

The "gouging through prices" capability of oil exporting nations seems to be a function of available pre-peak production capacity and market awareness of the peak.

Hence, the oil exporting nations want to keep the oil using nations fully supplied at a comfortable price level, in order to discourage them from transitioning to alternatives (in any significant quantity, assuming now that alternatives do exist).

However, this only applies as long as the importing nations believe that the exporters have ability to export for as long as possible (i.e. "peak is still 30-50 years away" belief). If exporters let importers know that exporters are near production peak, importers will scramble to transition to any available source. This may remove much of the scarcity power from oil exporters.

So, oil exporting nations can NOT freely gouge the importing nations at any desired price level. Their scarcity power appears to be dependent on a wide assumption of very late peak AND lack of near term alternatives for importers to transition to. Even then the gouging can only be applied up to a point.

Summa summarum: there is considerable reason to believe that oil exporting nations are not (only) happy to see $130/barrel level oil prices, because it risks the pricing power of their remaining oil reserves, if importers start an early transition to alternatives.

Of course, this reasoning assumes that the peak is late and that oil exporters still have plenty of remaining reserves. If the peak is now, then they have all the reason to start gouging to the max, as any meaningful (ordered) transition to alternatives will take 20-50 years at the very least. Plenty of oil can be sold throughout that time at exorbitant price levels.

So, the questions remains:

  1. When we are at these price levels when world economy is hurting and...
  2. Importing nations are talking and have already started transitioning to alternatives they say are viable substitutes...
  3. Oil exporters are saying they are far from their production peaks and that markets are well supplied and...
  4. Market fundamentalists say price rises are due to 'speculation' and 'manipulation', not due to true scarcity and that the price bubble will burst

Then who is lying and about which facts?

When trying to answer that question, keep in mind that:

  • Sweet crude is very very likely at peak since c. 2005. (ref: IEA/EIA)
  • World total liquids has struggled to keep up with earlier production levels, not to mention rise at the accustomed 1.6-2% annual rate (ref: IEA/EIA)
  • Exports of several major exporters have started to shrink (ref: IEA/EIA)
  • Some major exporters have publicly announced they will keep some oil 'in the ground for future generations' (ref: KSA)
  • A cut of X% in world oil production means roughly a cut of similar X% in world GDP (ref: Hirsch)
  • Inventory levels for oil do not point to a major rise in speculative buying off the markets (ref: various financial news)

(SamuM)
Clearly we are at price levels where the world economy is hurting, unfortunately lots of talk but very little action as far as transitioning. Countries with high gasoline/diesel taxes have moved further towards conserving liquid fuels, and will be better able to absorb the future large increases in price. Unfortunately the US has one of the lowest average fuel economy vehicle fleets and will have to move faster to reduce oil use. On the positive side they have very large electricity capacity 2 to 3 times larger than most developed countries so have the capacity to move to primarily electric powered vehicles. The other big advantage is the relative large number of vehicles per family, at least some of which have high mpg, allowing room to retire ( or scrap) the lowest economy vehicles or use them only occasionally.

Its hard to feel sorry for a new SUV owner complaining about $4 gallon gasoline when he is still paying much more on payments, insurance and depreciation, but easy to understand. Now at $12 a gallon, that same owner may well stop complaining and sell it or convert to CNG or electric or buy an older used high mpg vehicle. Of course some SUV owners don't drive very big distances(mainly to and from school/stores) so will just complain even at $12 a gallon gasoline until the next vehicle purchase.

Its hard to feel sorry for a new SUV owner complaining about $4 gallon gasoline when he is still paying much more on payments, insurance and depreciation, but easy to understand. Now at $12 a gallon, that same owner may well stop complaining and sell it or convert to CNG or electric or buy an older used high mpg vehicle. Of course some SUV owners don't drive very big distances(mainly to and from school/stores) so will just complain even at $12 a gallon gasoline until the next vehicle purchase.

http://www.ireport.com/docs/DOC-30851

Couldn't agree more. I just did my small part by posting a graphic, I recently created, on CNN. They had people post pictures of their SUV's and defend their reasons for driving them forever...I of course had a different take.

And don't forget wealthier people can simply buy a second or third more efficient vehicle for driving around, keeping the SUV for when needed. I've been seeing some of that where I live. High gas prices don't bother them. It's the poorer folks who get screwed because they can't afford a shiny new car every couple of years.

Rich people will always have a way to do things that mere mortals do not. Nothing changes in that respect.

Poor, however, are not directly hit by rising gas prices. Really poor do NOT drive to begin with (well may be they do in USA, but not in the rest of the world). Poor driving and being hit directly by rising gas prices is a myth, based on the assumption that poor drive. Poor are mostly hit through secondary effects through the rise in food prices and general inflation.

That leaves the middle-class. Us. The big consuming masses.

We're rightly hit by rising oil prices and we are unlikely to change our ways unless constrained by price and availability.

My premise for a while has been that the very nature of forced energy conservation requires an accelerating rate of increase in oil prices.

I am of course assuming an accelerating net oil export decline rate. Let's take all consumers in all oil importing countries and break them into five groups, ranked by income, from lowest to highest. At the bottom of the bottom quintile, we have a poor Third World consumer. At the top of the top quintile, we have Bill Gates,

Each successively higher quintile has vastly more purchasing power than the lower quintile, and energy expenditures as a percentage of incomes tend to decline as we move up the food chain, and each higher quintile has a lot more discretionary spending that can be shifted to non-discretionary food & energy spending, as food & energy prices increase.

This would seem to suggest a requirement for an accelerating rate of increase in oil prices in order to balance demand against an accelerating net export decline rate.

westexas

SamuM said:

Some major exporters have publicly announced they will keep some oil 'in the ground for future generations' (ref: KSA)

Does this information is taken in account in the ELM? In what way this can change the oil export decline rate?
Taken this in consideration and supposing that Peakoil hits MSM worldwide and that the public opinion of those exporting countries demand conservation of oil reserves (for instances, the winter in Russia and Norway is quite cold), the 2031 zero oil net export prevision can take place much sooner.

MetaPico

I made the same observation the other day -for example Jeffs ELM model predicts Norway and Russia to goto0 ~2023 but IMO once the 'cat is out the bag' and the energy crisis is well underway these countries will be forced towards Resource Nationalism well before this date.

The question is at which point between now and 0 NET exports do they start to do something we won't like one little bit?

Nick.

My own expectation for the US is that gas will eventually be rationed using a two tier price system: Level 1 - Say gas @$6.00/gallon with a limit of 10 gallons per licensed driver per week. And, Level 2 - gas @$9/gallon with unlimited purchases allowed.

To me, this might make both the middle and lower classes happy since their gas is "subsidized" in price while allowing the rich to have all the gas they want. Naturally, there would also be a trading system to allow unused subsidized gas credits to be traded.

Todd

Dec12th 2015, News just in: Black Market traded gas futures have just gone into Contango!