Cassandra's curse: how "The Limits to Growth" was demonized
Posted by Ugo Bardi on March 9, 2008 - 11:22am in The Oil Drum: Europe
Topic: Environment/Sustainability
Tags: limits to growth [list all tags]
Cassandra's story is very old: she was cursed that she would always tell the truth and never be believed. But it is also a very modern story and, perhaps, the quintessential Cassandras of our age are the group of scientists who prepared and published in 1972 the book titled "The Limits to Growth". With its scenarios of civilization collapse, the book shocked the world perhaps more than Cassandra had shocked her fellow Trojan citizens when she had predicted the fall of their city to the Achaeans. Just as Cassandra was not believed, so it was for the "Limits to Growth" which, today, is still widely seen as a thoroughly flawed study, wrong all along. This opinion is based only on lies and distortions but, apparently, Cassandra's curse is still alive and well in our times.
Above: image from an Athenian red vase from 5th century BC: Cassandra falls victim of the usual destiny of those who tell inconvenient truths.
The first book of the "The Limits to Growth" series was published in 1972 by a group of researchers of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Dennis Meadows, Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens III. The book reported the results of a study commissioned by a group of intellectuals who had formed the "Club of Rome" a few years before. It examined the evolution of the whole world's economy by means of a mathematical model based on "system dynamics", a method that had been developed earlier on by Jay W. Forrester. Using computers, a novelty for the time, the LTG world model could keep track of a large number of variables and of their interactions as the system changed with time. The authors developed a number of scenarios for the world's future in various assumptions. They found that, unless specific measures were taken, the world's economy tended to collapse at some time in 21st century. The collapse was caused by a combination of resource depletion, overpopulation, and growing pollution (this last element we would see today as related to global warming).
In 1972, the LTG study arrived in a world that had known more than two decades of unabated growth after the end of the Second World War. It was a time of optimism and faith in technological progress that, perhaps, had never been so strong in the history of humankind. With nuclear power on the rise, with no hint that mineral resources were scarce, with population growing fast, it seemed that the limits to growth, if such a thing existed, were so far away in the future that there was no reason to worry. In any case, even if these limits were closer than generally believed, didn't we have technology to save us? With nuclear energy on the rise, a car in every garage, the Moon just conquered in 1968, the world seemed to be all set for a shiny future. Against that general feeling, the results of LTG were a shock.
There is a legend lingering around the LTG report that says that it was laughed off as an obvious quackery immediately after it was published. It is not true. The study was debated and criticized, as it is normal for a new theory or idea. But it raised enormous interest and millions of copies were sold. Evidently, despite the general optimism of the time, the study had given visibility to a feeling that wasn't often expressed but that was in everybody's minds. Can we really grow forever? And if we can't, for how long can growth last? The LTG study provided an answer to these questions; not a pleasant one, but an answer nevertheless.
The LTG study had everything that was needed to become a major advance in science. It came from a prestigious institution, the MIT; it was sponsored by a group of brilliant and influential intellectuals, the Club of Rome; it used the most modern and advanced computation techniques and, finally, the events that were taking place a few years after publication, the great oil crisis of the 1970s, seemed to confirm the vision of the authors. Yet, the study failed in generating a robust current of academic research and, a couple of decades after the publication, the general opinion about it had completely changed. Far from being considered the scientific revolution of the century, in the 1990s LTG had become everyone's laughing stock. Little more than the rumination of a group of eccentric (and probably slightly feebleminded) professors who had really thought that the end of the world was near. In short, Chicken Little with a computer.
The reversal of fortunes of LTG was gradual and involved a debate that lasted for decades. At first, critics reacted with little more than a series of statements of disbelief which carried little weight. There were a few early papers carrying more in-depth criticism, notably by William Nordhaus (1973) and by a group of researchers of the university of Sussex that went under the name of the "Sussex Group" (Cole 1973). Both studies raised a number of interesting points but failed in their attempt of demonstrating that the LTG study was flawed in its basic assumptions.
Already these early papers by Nordhaus and by the Sussex group showed an acrimonious streak that became common in the debate from the side of the critics. Political criticism, personal attacks and insults against the LTG authors, and in general a rather rude attitude. For instance, the editor of the journal that had published Nordhaus' 1973 paper refused to published Forrester's response to it. With time, the debate veered more and more on the political side. In 1997, the Italian economist Giorgio Nebbia, noted that the reaction against the LTG study had arrived from at least four different fronts. One was from those who saw the book as a threat to the growth of their businesses and industries. A second set was that of professional economists, who saw LTG as a threat to their dominance in advising on economic matters. The Catholic world provided further ammunition for the critics, being piqued at the suggestion that overpopulation was one of the major causes of the problems. Then, the political left in the Western World saw the LTG study as a scam of the ruling class, designed to trick workers into believing that the proletarian paradise was not a practical goal. And this by Nebbia is a clearly incomplete list; forgetting religious fundamentalists, the political right, the believers in infinite growth, politicians seeking for easy solutions to all problems and many others.
All together, these groups formed a formidable coalition that guaranteed a strong reaction against LTG. This reaction eventually succeeded in demolishing the study in the eyes of the majority of the public and of specialists at the same time. This demolition was greatly helped by a factor that initially had bolstered the credibility of the study: the world oil crisis of the 1970s
The crisis had peaked in 1979 but, in the years that followed, oil started flowing abundantly from the North Sea and from Saudi Arabia. With oil prices plummeting down, it seemed to many that the crisis had been nothing but a scam; the failed attempt of a group of fanatic sheiks of dominating the world using oil as a weapon. Oil, it seemed, was, and had always been, plentiful and was destined to remain so forever. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the "New Economy" appearing, all worries seemed to be over. History had ended and all what we needed to do was to relax and enjoy the fruits that our high technology would provide for us.
At this point, a perverse effect started to act on people's minds. In the late 1980s, all what was remembered of the LTG book, published almost two decades before, was that it had predicted some kind of catastrophe at some moment in the future. If the world oil crisis had been that catastrophe, as it had seemed to many, the fact that it was over was the refutation of the same prediction. This factor had a major effect on people's perception of the LTG study.
The change in attitudes was gradual and spanned a number of years, however we can locate a specific date and an author for the actual turning point, the switch that changed LTG from a respectable, if debatable, study to everybody's laughing stock. It happened in 1989 when Ronald Bailey, science editor of the Forbes magazine, published a sneering attack (Bailey 1989) against Jay Forrester, the father of system dynamics. The attack was also directed against the LTG book which Bailey said was, “as wrong-headed as it is possible to be”. To prove his point Bailey revived an observation that had already been made in 1972 by a group of economists on the "New York Times" (Passel 1972). Bailey said that:
“Limits to Growth” predicted that at 1972 rates of growth the world would run out of gold by 1981, mercury by 1985, tin by 1987, zinc by 1990, petroleum by 1992, copper, lead and natural gas by 1993.
In 1993 Bailey reiterated his accusations in the book titled “Ecoscam.” This time, he could state that none of the predictions of the 1972 LTG study had turned out to be correct.
Of course, Bailey’s accusations are just plain wrong. What he had done was extracting a fragment of the LTG text and criticizing it out of context. In table 4 of the second chapter of the book, he had found a row of data (column 2) for the duration, expressed in years, of some mineral resources. He had presented these data as the only "predictions" that the study had made and he had based his criticism on that, totally ignoring the rest of the book.
Reducing a book of more than a hundred pages to a few numbers is not the only fault of Bailey's criticism. The fact is that none of the numbers he had selected was a prediction and nowhere in the book it was stated that these numbers were supposed to be read as such. Table 4 was there only to illustrate the effect of a hypothetical continued exponential growth on the exploitation of mineral resources. Even without bothering to read the whole book, the text of chapter 2 clearly stated that continued exponential growth was not to be expected. The rest of the book, then, showed various scenarios of economic collapse that in no case took place before the first decades of 21st century.
It would have taken little effort to debunk Bailey's claims. But it seemed that, despite the millions of copies sold, all the LTG books had ended in the garbage bin. Or, perhaps, browsing one's shelves was considered too much of an effort to be worth doing in a moment when, with the new economy starting to run, there were better things to do. Whatever the case, Bailey's criticism had success and it started behaving with all the characteristics of what we call today “urban legends." We all know how persistent urban legends can be, no matter how silly they are. At the time of Bailey's article and book, the internet as we know it didn't exist yet, but word of mouth and the press were sufficient to spread and multiply the legend of the "wrong predictions" of the LTG study.
Just to give an example, let's see how Bailey's text even reached the serious scientific literature. In 1993, William Nordhaus had published a paper titled “Lethal Models” which was meant as an answer to the second edition of LTG, published in 1992. Despite the title, a little aggressive to say the least, it was a serious study. In it, Nordhaus criticized the 1992 LTG study, but also corrected some of the most glaring mistakes of his first study on the subject (Nordhaus 1973). However, the paper was accompanied by a series of texts by various authors grouped under the title of “Comments and Discussion”. A better definition of that section would have been "feeding frenzy" as criticism of this distinguished group of academic economists clearly went out of control. Among these texts, we find one by Robert Stavins, an economist from Harvard University, where we can read that:
If we check today to see how the Limits I predictions have turned out, we learn that (according to their estimates) gold, silver, mercury, zinc, and lead should be thoroughly exhausted, with natural gas running out within the next eight years. Of course, this has not happened.
That, obviously, is taken straight from Bailey. Apparently, the excitement of a "Limits-bashing" session had led Stavins to forget that it is the duty of a serious scientist to check the reliability of the sources that he or she cites. Unfortunately, with this paper the legend of the “wrong predictions” of LTG was even enshrined in a serious academic journal.
With the 1990s, and in particular with the development of the internet, we can say that the dam gave way and a true flood of criticism swamped LTG and its authors. One after the other, scientists, journalists, and whoever felt entitled to discuss the subject, started repeating the same line over and over: the LTG study had predicted a catastrophe that didn’t take place and therefore the whole idea was wrong.
After a while the concept of the “wrong predictions” became so widespread that it wasn’t any more necessary to state in detail what these wrong predictions were. At some point, it became politically incorrect even to declare that LTG might have been, after all, not so wrong as some people thought. The criticism could also become aggressive and I can cite at least one internet page where you can read that the authors of the LTG book should be killed, cut to pieces, and their organs sent to organ banks. Hopefully, that was meant as a joke (perhaps). Today, we can use Google to find Bailey's legend repeated on the internet literally thousands of times in various forms, with minimal variations. In hundreds of cases, it is exactly the same, cut and pasted as it is; in others it is just slightly modified.
At this point, we may ask ourselves whether this wave of slander had arisen by itself, as the result of the normal mechanism of human legends, or it had been somehow masterminded by someone, the result of what we call nowadays "viral marketing". Can we think of a conspiracy organized against the LTG group, or against their sponsors, the Club of Rome?
The question is not unreasonable since the LTG authors were accused in all seriousness by ostensibly respectable researchers to be themselves the acting branch of an evil conspiracy organized by the oil multinationals in order to enslave most of humankind and create "a kind of fanatical dictatorship" (Golub and Towsend, 1977). Could it be that the LTG group were victims, rather than perpetrators, of a conspiracy?
On this point we can seek an analogy with the case of Rachel Carson, well known for her book “Silent Spring” of 1962 in which she criticized the overuse of DDT and other pesticides. Also Carson's book was strongly criticized and demonized. Kimm Groshong has reviewed the story and she tells us in her 2002 study that:
The minutes from a meeting of the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association, Inc. on May 8, 1962, demonstrate this curious stance. Discussing the matter of what was printed in Carson’s serialization in the New Yorker, the official notes read: "The Association has the matter under serious consideration, and a meeting of the Public Relations Committee has been scheduled on August 10 to discuss measures which should be taken to bring the matter back to proper perspective in the eyes of the public."
Whether we can call that a "conspiracy" is open to discussion, but clearly there was an organized effort on the part of the chemical industry against Rachel Carson's ideas. By analogy, we could think that, in some smoke filled room, representatives of the world's industry had gathered to decide what measures to take against the LTG study in order to “bring the matter back to proper perspective in the eyes of the public”
We can't rule out that something like that took place, but it seems unlikely. Surely, think tanks and political groups financed studies that were likely to arrive to conclusions differing from those of LTG. But the demolition of the LTG ideas seems to have been mainly a spontaneous process, probably helped, but not directly caused, by economic interests. The 1989 article by Ronald Bailey was no more than a catalyst for something that, most likely, would have taken place anyway. It was the result of the tendency of our minds to believe what we want to believe and to disbelieve what we don’t want to believe.
Now, in the early years of 21st century the general attitude towards LTG seems to be changing again. The war, after all, is won by those who win the last battle and the LTG ideas are becoming again popular. One of the first cases of reappraisal has been that of Matthew Simmons (2000), expert on crude oil resources. It seems that the "peak oil movement" has been instrumental in bringing back to attention the LTG study. Indeed, oil depletion can be seen as a subset of the world model used in the study (Bardi 2008).
Climate studies have also brought back the limits of resources to attention; in this case intended as the limited capability of the atmosphere to absorb the products of human activities. In this field, the LTG study can be seen as having taken the right approach from the beginning; modeling for the first time the interaction of the environment with the human industrial and agricultural system.
But it is not at all obvious that a certain view of the world, one that takes into account the finite amount of resources, is going to become prevalent, or even just respectable. Consider that, in the 1980s - 1990s, a decade of lull in oil prices was enough to convince everyone that all worries about resource depletion were akin to the substance that male bovines produce from their rear end. Now, imagine that for some reasons the world's average temperatures were to stabilize, or even slightly go down, for some years. Or imagine that oil prices were to stabilize or go down for some years. That wouldn't change anything to the concepts of global warming and peak oil, which deal both with long term changes. But it would be sufficient to unleash a smear wave similar to that which engulfed LTG. It could easily do the same damage to the efforts against global warming and oil depletion.
Prophets of doom, nowadays, are not stoned to death, at least not usually. Demolishing ideas that we don't like is done in a rather subtler manner. The success of the smear campaign against the LTG ideas shows the power of propaganda and of urban legends in shaping the public perception of the world, exploiting our innate tendency of rejecting bad news. Because of these tendencies, the world has chosen to ignore the warning of impending collapse that came from the LTG study. In so doing, we have lost more than 30 years. Now, there are signs that we may be starting to heed the warning, but it may be too late and we may still be doing too little. Cassandra's curse may still be upon us.
References
Bailey, Ronald 1989, “Dr. Doom” Forbes, Oct 16, p. 45
Bardi, U. 2008, "Peak oil and the Limits to Growth: two parallel stories", The Oil Drum. http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/3550
Cole H.S.D., Freeman C., Jahoda M., Pavitt K.L.R., 1973, “Models of Doom” Universe Books, New York
Golub R., Townsend J., 1977, “Malthus, Multinationals and the Club of Rome” vol 7, p 201-222
Groshong, K. 2002, "The Noisy Response to Silent Spring: Placing Rachel Carson’s Work in Context!, Pomona College, Science, Technology, and Society Department Senior Thesis http://www.sts.pomona.edu/ThesisSTS.pdf
Nebbia, G. 1997, Futuribili, New Series, Gorizia (Italy) 4(3) 149-82
Nordhaus W., 1973 “Word Dynamics: Measurements without Data“, The Economic Journal n. 332.
Nordhaus W. D., 1992, “Lethal Models” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1
Passel, P., Roberts, M., Ross L., 1972, New York Times, April 2
Simmons, M., 2000, “Revisiting The Limits to Growth: Could The Club of Rome Have Been Correct, After All?” http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/files/172.pdf



A fine essay, thank you.
Reminds me of a time when I was part of an academic workshop and brought up Limits to Growth with one of my colleagues (who I really like and respect) and he blurted out "but they got all their predictions wrong." I just stopped in my tracks, dumbfounded, because I had just read the book and it appeared to have done just the opposite: not making any "firm" predictions, while still developing frightening scenarios that looked eerily familiar when reading the news.
Exactly so, and thank you Ugo. I read the original in 1972 and have always held the view that Meadows et.al. got it about right and so I have let the book influence me throughout my adult life. I think it has helped me to see the world as it really is. I commend, to those who haven't read it yet, the 2005 version, Limits to Growth the 30 Year Update, Meadows, Randers and Meadows. Pub. Earthscan.
I can say that it had a similar impression upon me as a new engineering (ChE) student. We were required to read it as part of the Introduction to Engineering Course that we all took. Seems we read Jay Forrester's work before LTG came out.
The lesson objective was that in dealing with complex exponentials counter-intuitive outcomes and counter-intuitive steps to "prevent" disaster were likely to be required and definitely considered.
It is a common experience. Still last month I was interviewed by a journalist who started it asking me something like: "Don't you think that your views could turn out to be as wrong as the predictions of the Club of Rome in the 1970s?" The power of propaganda is truly awesome.
I have read M R Simmons summary "Revisiting the Club of Rome", also his book TITD.
Is the CERA Lynch/C.J Campbell saga not disimilar to this? Campbell is often accused of incorrectly predicting oil depletion dates. I,m not sure he actually did. He may have made reference to dates, but not necessarily predictions. From where I'm standing, the Simmons/Campbell camp may have the last "laugh" on this one. (It won't be funny)
Hi Ugo,
Thank you for the thoughtful post and starting this discussion. I have also had the experience, after a seminar, of hearing, "Your work is like Limits to Growth and the Club of Rome. They got it wrong."
In that context, it is interesting to look at nonrenewable resource use in the two scenarios from Limits to Growth, The 30-Year Update, shown below.
Figure 4-11 Scenario 1: A Reference Point
Figure 4-12: More Abundant Nonrenewable Resources
"Resources" in the graph means nonrenewable resources, and the top of the resources scale is given in Appendix 1 as 2x10^12. The units are not specified, but if we identify fossil fuels with nonrenewable resources, Ttoe is a reasonable fit. If this interpretation is wrong, someone please correct me. In Scenario 1, the ultimate would then be 1Ttoe, and the cumulative production would reach half of this by 2016. In Scenario 2, the ultimate would be 2Ttoe, and we would reach the half-way point by 2040. This range of years for the half-way point would probably be considered reasonable by many Oil Drum regulars.
There are 8 other Scenarios in the book, and they all use the higher ultimate. The nonrenewable resource use in most is similar to Scenario 2, but there are a wide range of responses for the other quantities.
Dave
Seconded (both your praise of Ugo's post and the following note).
I never cease to be amazed at how many people misunderstood LTG...
Look, do you guys seriously expect people to read something before criticising it?
Next you'll be saying we have to taste a meal before saying it's good or bad, watch a movie before reviewing it, and look at a woman before deciding she's ugly.
Really this is just a ridiculous standard that's being set here.
As an undergraduate at Carnegie-Mellon in the early seventies, one of the profs actually got a copy of the program used and we got to run it for one of our chem-eng courses (box of Fortran cards running on an IBM 360). Made an impression on me at the time, mainly because of the assumptions you had to make to not have a disaster in the 21st century.
I graduated from high school the year LTG came out. I was fascinated by the idea and had some programming experience so took on the project of translating the code in Jay Forrester, "World Dynamics" into Fortran and duplicating his results. I would have arguments with my dad in those days about the validity of the whole thing. I would argue that if you did not like some aspect of the model, then suggest something more likely - and we can test out that supposition. My father would argue that there are human factors - our response to conditions, that can't be included in models. We are at the crossroads now. Is humanity able to collectively see our current conundrum and change direction in time, or are we subject to the coefficients in the LTG models?
Since that time the study of complex systems has become an independent discipline of its own. We now know more about the evolution of chaotic systems, about islands of stability, and bifurcation in state space to new uncharted regimes. At the time, the LTG study just said that when the lines on the graphs became too vertical, the models broke down. From the perspectives of complexity theory, this is still the way it is - we just expect that after a period of unpredictable thrashing, the system will come to another quasi-stable equilibrium - that may or may not include a population of human beings.
I think a key problem for those of us trying to prepare for the future is the tendency of humans (reinforced by the media) to want "predictions." I was struck by how the Limits to Growth study discussed scenarios - which opponents then claimed were predictions. Problem is, no one can predict the future - but we can reasonably consider the evidence and anticipate possible scenarios as to what might happen, so as to be prepared, as Limits to Growth was advocating.
Even though the Limits to Growth didn't fall into The Prediction Trap (the title of my upcoming book, which you can preview at my web site), their opponents realized the power of painting the study as a prediction. As noted, if you demolish one prediction, credibility for the rest of the information plummets - though for some reason this doesn't seem to apply to economic predictions...
In fact, maybe that is the way out for Peak Oil awareness. Rather than trying to convince people of peak oil, maybe we should make a significant effort to publicize the predictions of peak oil deniers - like the oil price predictions that the EIA and others have made for years, that are widely off base.
P.S. Another frustrating piece of history: Jimmy Carter's speech on energy April 18, 1977:
http://millercenter.org/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe_1977_0418_ca...
Thanks for writing this. The opening chaper of LTG, the 30 Year Update (prior mentioned) discusses the smear campaign. There were also numerous other models created that puported to show more "opimistic" outcomes, though the primary suppression technique of LTG was, as you mentioned, to make false quotations of specific predictions and then shoot them down. I use the LTG 30 Year Update graphs in a traveling slideshow I conduct. One of the most fascinating things about the LTG models is how little future growth we get our or increased/ new energy supplies. A doubling of available resources only gives us 10-15 years more growth. Again, not an exact prediction, but it points out how powerfully growth can consume resources, and the moot nature of "alternative" fuels if we cannot control growth. LTG remains a profound and powerful study, but one that contradicts the western cosmology, hence the suppression. Ted Trainer's more recent book Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain a Consumer Society makes some similar points.
There are two other groups that are doing good work within a limits to growth model. The folks over at
www.footprintnetwork.org
and
www.rprogress.org
have done quite good work assessing the condition of fresh water, fisheries, forests, soil, etc. and have concluded that humanity crossed into overshoot sometime in the 80's. Overshoot can last only so long. It seems that we are going to bump into the limits rather soon, perhaps led by biofuels and increased food prices.
As for why the populace "spontaneously" denigrated Limits to Growth, I think a good place to look is the various discourses (long-lived, society-wide conversations) that are operating at any given moment in the network of human conversations. In fact, I assert that the response the LTG researchers got was in no way spontaneous.
Foucault distinguished various epistemes for humanity, which could loosely be thought of as "proscribed ways of thinking" and these, he said, were governed by discourses. To Foucault, we are currently living in the "things always progress" episteme, which started, I believe, at the beginning of the 19th century. A discourse will express itself in various sub-conversations. Obama's "audacity of hope" message is a variant of "things always progress." The expectation that our standard of living "should" always increase is another variant. Given that episteme/discourse (I shall use discourse herein), it's no wonder LTG was fought against.
Discourses have the effect of acting like a paradigm or context inside of which we think. Almost everything thought by most humans will have reference to or live inside of the current prevailing discourses. Some discourses live in just one society, others seem to be shared by most humans (the discourse for war seems to be global, the discourse for women's equality is specific to just a few countries). The few people who recognize the prevailing discourses and step outside of them will trigger the immune system of the prevailing discourse.
The people who express the discourse defending itself don't say to themselves, "Such and such a person is breaking the discourse." They often reason and gather evidence and make cogent arguments (or not so cogent as it happens) — all inside the discourse — all while they have no idea of the constraints that are operating on them. They don't know that the discourse is, in a very real way, using them to express itself. This doesn't negate the concept of "free will," it just means that an individual must "be woken up" by someone who teaches them that that discourses are running the show most of the time. The Eastern concept of enlightenment is merely the individual distinguishing them-self from the discourses. Just by reading this, some people will have something click that never did before and thus become "enlightened." (Others will resist what I'm saying but perhaps the seed will be planted.)
In my experience, especially when significant emotion is present, it's almost always a discourse doing the speaking; the individual and any "free will" recedes to the background.
My wife and I have fun asking ourselves: which conversation is running me right now? When I'm "plugged in" during an argument with her, it's the "I'm right, you're wrong" conversation and it takes effort to interrupt that. When we discuss money, a whole host of conversations want to take over, but the predominant one for me is "conserve in case the future brings something unknown" and I have to watch that or I won't take calculated risks.
A discourse that is arising in the world right now is the one to do with peak oil. A discourse that took a while to graduate from being just a conversation to a full-fledged discourse is "global warming."
If people respond to this comment, the perceptive reader will try to distinguish which discourses are operating. Blogs are wonderful places to study discourses.
-André
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Episteme
A brilliant jewel of a post.
Connecting dots, there's also the ArchDruid:
http://thearchdruidreport.blogspot.com/2007/08/twelfth-hour.html
and Transactional Analysis
http://changingminds.org/explanations/behaviors/ta.htm
and Apperception and Narrative
http://asweknowit.ca/evcult/LitEvol.shtml
.. which like all evolving systems, are challenged to adapt - when the bases and assumptions on which they are founded and grow - and if the change is too great they will fail to thrive.
Which underlies my realistic-assumption/pessimism about PO and GW; we seem no more able to avoid catastrophe than and ant's nest in a forest fire...
Discourse: 'me too' / 'im ok, youre ok' ;)
j
Hi, jmullee. Thanks for the kind words.
The ArchDruid post is fabulous...the author definitely was noticing discourses operating in their blog.
The Transaction Analysis post is good because it shows that conversations can be assigned an age to them. For instance, when I am emotional, my conversations tend to become quite young ("I did too leave my keys right there, you must have taken them!" — an embarrassing actual conversation).
"It's not fair" is another very young conversation that we learn very early and most of us never really let go. In fact, the concept of fairness is employed everywhere and is the basis of much legislation and generally how we interact with each other. People become quite indignant when the "it's not fair" conversation is operating them. Something being fair or not is simply a product of a prevailing discourse. The universe at its core is just doing its universe thing and it takes us humans to assign the concept of "fair" or "unfair." Without humans (more specifically, without the presence of representational language), "fair" could not exist.
Many people are going to see peak oil as "unfair" and stay at that age. For people who speak publicly about peak oil or any other serious matter that occurs as threatening to people, the job is always to lead the audience into an adult conversation before the speech is complete.
The age of conversations on blogs often becomes quite young, somewhere around the 3 to 6 year-old range. I like The Oil Drum because the age of the conversations is overwhelmingly adult (although every once in a while it does get quite young). The people conversing here, I think, are very good at keeping the conversation age high and I see them often resisting to lower the age when someone else has started down that road.
I didn't read the whole of the last link but it appears to distinguish the set of conversations that humans use as part of their identity (their concept of self), particularly as it shows up in novels and stories.
You assigned your response "me too" / "i'm ok, you're ok" (thanks for playing with me!) and it seems valid to me. Because of your comments re: our inability to avoid catastrophe, the larger discourse your comments might fit within might be "it's hopeless" or as some people have chosen to label it, "we're doomed."
That, of course, is just another discourse. :-)
-Andre'
Howdy;
From all accounts, and from a fairly wide and varied bunch of friends here in little old Ireland, our societies are basically captive to these discourses that focus on economic performance to the exclusion of practically all else.
Within my lifetime i've seen televisions supplant and eradicate a sustained culture which has probably survived on the irish western seaboard for something like 8000 years.
Archaelogical finds suggest that after the ice age, our forebears lived day to day with essentially the same equipment used by my grandparents, minus a bit of metal and finer textiles.
If 'the powers that be' - and these same powers have had the foresight to avoid investing in public transport, education and health for decades (/sarcsm) - continue to ignore anything not of immediate concern to a tiny group of undereducated postcolonial investors (who are all assured positions on the board of directors from birth), then indeed it is prudent to cost-benefit some preparations for the worst-case scenario.
These people have homes without bookshelves ! - they remind me of the migratory groups that Jared Diamond described in 'guns germs and steel' who, in adapting to the very easy life on a paradisiacal island, even lost the ability to make fire.
Editorial control of the narrative, of the consensual hallucination, has historically here in ireland been the privilege of the Fili, or druids and poets.
These days the same power lies in the hands of the 'free' press, entirely beholden to advertisers eager to appeal to the most-easily-stimulatable desires of thier selected demographic segments.
So this situation has very carefully stripped out any consideration of, or responsiveness to, anything but the bottom dollar and the quarterly result.
I even heard that G.W.Bush's administration excludes from consideration anything further away than 3 months.
The extreme feminist views of kristeva and cisoux etc, demolishing the entire patrifocal linear narrative seemed to me to be a recipie for mass psychosis (might explain the huge number of pharmacies in urban france !).
Narratives seem essential to psychological coherence, though perhaps I lack the imagination to see beyond the camp-fire-light.
I can't forsee the emergence of any force or factor sufficiently strong and coherent to cause real change in the discourse, except for the olduvai cliff itself.
TVs are still filled wall-to-wall with car and holiday adverts (last time I looked at one).
The only examples I can think of, of societies whose discourses were demolished, are those vanquished by colonising forces; think of proud, fierce and wild amazonas hunters ending up shining shoes in a slum in Rio.
Perhaps that is what is really in store for us all - an end to captivity and return to the feral state, ironically just at the point when we have captured the last remaining wild humans in the snares of consumerism.
At end also I should confess that in selecting the doomer banner to march behind, I find purpose and invigoration .. which I lacked whilst contemplating a future history comprised only of ever-more-'efficient' mass consumerism!
So, in conclusion, am I betting my kids lives that somehow Bruce Willis will turn up and compel us all to power-down to 19th century tech?
Nope.
I wouldn't miss this for all the chi in china :)
j
Andre, I wanted to thank you and note an appreciation for your posts in general and this one in particular. Well done.
"fairness" may be one of the most intransigent and harmful "monkey concepts" we have to come to grips with (and probably won't). Even among intelligent folks, "making the situation fair" is often a tacit overlay for any consideration or action. It drastically limits the rational options for action.
kudos.
You're welcome, greenish. Thanks for reading them :-).
-André
Andre - what a thoughtful post!
Last year I was having a conversation with my sister about what I call "the unsustainable growth economy" (GDP growth of 2 to 3% anually). She is an economist so she more than anyone should realize that economic growth always reaches a peak and then deminishing returns. She argued against my assertions and finally at the end of the conversation she made a plea, "I need that growth to continue because otherwise my IRA will fail to mature and I won't ever be able to retire!"
LTG is an emotional issue for people and the challenge of defusing that psycology is difficult to impossible. Simply winning an argument is a waste of time if the loser of the argument is still attached to their original beliefs.
I was one of 3 speakers at an evening set of presentations around earth day once and one of the speakers mentioned this "need for retirement accounts to grow" as one of the last arguments put forth by academics who find themselves failing to respond in any other way.
Reminds me of Andre's child talk!
Well, that's what it is. People believe in things because those things make the world make sense to them.
About three years ago I was talking to a friend with a heavy mortgage. He said it was alright because "house prices will always go up", so if the payments were too hard for him they could just sell.
"They can't go up forever," I said.
"Why not?"
"At some point the price of housing will be greater than the average family can afford."
"Oh then people will demand higher wages, wages will go up so it'll be okay."
"When incomes and prices go up together, that's called inflation, mate. If I earn $10 an hour and bread is $1, if tomorrow bread goes to $2 then my income going to $20 an hour leaves me exactly where I was, paying 10% of my income on bread."
"But... prices have to keep going up."
"Why? They might even go down. Houses are like anything else, demand is high up goes the price, demand is low down goes the price."
"House prices can't drop!"
"Why not?"
"Because then we'd be fucked. What would we do?"
Lots of people confuse the way they want things to be with the way they are :) Thus the difficulty in understanding the concept of limits to growth.
Hey André
Great comment! Foucault discources seem very similar to meme theory that I was first exposed to in Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene.
Jason Brenno and I at the Hubbert Tribute are uncovering startling new information about how the "things always progress" discourse has manifested itself in United States energy policy over the past six decades.
If we continue on the current trajectory of misinformation about the tightening of the oil market in major media (i.e., anything but peak), the new dominant post-peak discourse will be that the permanent energy crisis we are experiencing was a result of our not understanding energy or perhaps ignoring some obscure experts. We will likely be told that our energy policy of the past really was not an energy policy but that no one really knew what was happening at the time - that it was all just misguided, unorganized optimism and that we could not have done anything differently given the circumstances of the time. This is far from the truth.
In reality, all the information was on the table in the decade of the 1950s. Recoverable resource estimates in 1950s - which have proven to be highly accurate - indicated that we needed to be very careful with how we planned our future. Various experts including Hubbert, Pogue and Hill of Chase Manhattan Bank, and Andrew Crichton predicted that U.S. oil, natural gas, and coal resources could not possibly support a high growth economy for any reasonable length of time. A rational review of the recoverable resource estimates of the time suggests that we needed to begin a long term plan to create a sustainable society based on proven renewable energy sources.
As an example, take a look at the peak diagram that Chase Manhattan Bank's Petroleum Group put out in 1956. Hubbert was not alone in the wilderness. At least not at first.
In the stupor technological optimism, we have overestimated the value of technology and underestimated that of energy as explained by Stuart Udall's 1976 essay "Super Technology: The God that Failed" and now as you point out by Robert Hirsch.
Over the next year, The Hubbert Tribute will show that the discourse of "things always progress" has led us over the past six decades to bet our economy and future on speculative technological advances that never come to fruition. In the late 1950s, key individuals in government, think tanks, and corporations opted to use their influence and decision making capacity to forward a perpetual high-growth economy dependent on high-grade finite fossil fuels in the hopes that technology would make low-grade resources economic over time.
They believed that speculative technological advances including coal to liquids, oil shale, breeder reactors, fusion, and enhanced oil recovery would become economic in the long run, thereby justifying the continuing growth of a consumerist suburban, car-oriented way of life and fueling the development of a highly industrial globalized system for the rest of the world.
This discourse still governs a highly ineffective mainstream energy policy discussion peppered with oft-unchallenged assumptions that many of the speculative "solutions" of the past and a few newer concepts (e.g., hydrogen, cellulosic ethanol) will be able to seamlessly replace oil, capture any carbon that is emitted in the process and eventually substitute any finite fossil fuel resource when its exhaustion is imminent.
Stay tuned...
I have sometimes described an encounter I had after I gave a presentation on Peak Oil to a local Rotary Club in Dallas. A gentleman came up and said that while he agreed with what I had said, he was surprised that I had not yet been assassinated. He was of course (mostly) kidding, but it does illustrate the old adage about the difficulty of trying to get someone to understand something when their income is depdendent on them not understanding you.
Thank you, Ugo, for posting your interesting historical perspective on the research efforts surrounding Dennis Meadows and his book Limits to Growth.
When the first of these reports were published in the early 70s, I was a young graduate student at ETH Zurich. I read all of those books with great interest and intensity. The first of these books was Forrester's World Dynamics book, published in 1971. Forrester's WORLD2 model was considerably simpler than Meadows' WORLD3 model, described in the book Limits to Growth that was published in 1972. Whereas Meadows presented in his book only the results obtained with his model but not the model itself, Forrester included his entire model in his book. Consequently, I was able to quickly implement it in a simulation tool that I had available at that time and started playing around with it. Meadows subsequently also published his entire model in 1974 in a separate book: Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World. Yet, as the model is quite complex, it wasn't easy to extract all of the equations governing that model from the book. Subsequent yet more refined models included the model by Mesarovic and Pestel, described in the 1980 book World modeling: The Mesarovic-Pestel world model in the context of its contemporaries by Barry Hughes. The only one of these books that has seen multiple editions is the book Limits to Growth that is currently in its 3rd edition, published in 2004.
I met many of the early actors personally, including Forrester, Meadows, Mesarovic, Pestel, Rademaker, and a few more. In my view, your assessment paints a picture that is a bit too black-and-white. On the one hand, the stigmatization of these efforts started long before 1989. Precisely because the books by Forrester and Meadows were so immensely popular initially, selling millions of copies over night (Forrester's 1971 book sold 65 million copies and was translated into 25 languages), politicians, especially in the U.S., immediately killed all funding sources for this type of research. Researchers in the U.S. found it impossible to receive any further research funds for their efforts, making it impossible to pay graduate student salaries, unless they agreed to work for one of the national laboratories under strict order that any and every manuscript would have to be approved by the DIA before it could be sent off to publication. Most researchers rejected to work under those conditions, because it is unfair toward their graduate students. On the other hand, the stigmatization never fully succeeded. Meadows and his co-workers never became the "laughing stock" of the scientific community that you made us believe. For example, a research effort was created at ETH Zurich around 1990, called the Alliance for Global Sustainability that initially funded research at ETH Zurich and at MIT, later also at Tokyo University and at Chalmers University, paid for initially by a Swiss industrialist (Max Schmidheiny). Meadows and co-workers were always well received at the AGS and were always highly respected for their seminal efforts.
The WORLD3 model is currently available as a STELLA program by Dennis Meadows. If you are interested in receiving a copy, you can send an email message to Dennis. He usually responds to email quickly and reliably. STELLA is a commercial product, but the software is fairly cheap, and you can get a STELLA reader for free. The reader doesn't allow you to develop your own codes, but it enables you to look at existing programs.
I myself recently ported both the WORLD2 and the WORLD3 (2004 edition) models to another software called Modelica. My codes contain all of the scenarios listed in the books by Forrester and Meadows. Dennis Meadows and Jørgen Randers were kind enough to supply me with all information necessary to reproduce the 10 scenarios of the book Limits to Growth. My library is in the public domain and can be downloaded for free. However in order to run these models or even to look at them, you need a Modelica implementation. I myself use Dymola, a commercial product that is rather expensive (but very powerful). There is also available a free open-source implementation, called OpenModelica. You then also need a separate graphical front-end, called MathModelica Lite, which is also free.
Last week, I presented a paper, entitled World3 in Modelica: Creating System Dynamics Models in the Modelica Framework describing my new library at the 2008 Modelica Conference held in Bielefeld, Germany. Through the above link, you can download the paper itself (in PDF format) and also my Powerpoint presentation.
Francois, you are right, the reaction against LTG started much before 1989. In order to keep the text short, I had to compress the story and perhaps it looks a little "black and white". However, from what I could gather from the ancient literature I managed to dig out, the feeling is that there was an abrupt change around mid 1980s. Before, there were many papers criticizing LTG, but always with some caution. Well, not exactly always. Good old Julian Simon criticized LTG in his "the Ultimate resource" in 1981 in a way that is still worth reading to see how propaganda works and how much facts can be twisted to suit one's purposes. I have collected a lot of data on the debate; one of these days I should write a whole book on that. In fact, I plan to do so; if I can. Thanks for adding some more details about the debate to my data base.
Ah.... just a note: you are a bit optimistic in saying that FOrrester's book sold "65 million copies". It was a success, but from the data I have, it sold a few tens of thousands of copies. About LTG sales, there are wild numbers over the web. I asked to Dennis Meadows about that and he says that nobody really knows the exact number of copies sold. The records were lost, apparently, when Aurelio Peccei was forced to leave his office at Fiat, in Torino. According to Dennis, it is "a few million copies" but not tens of millions
Ugo:
In the summer of 1974, I attended the SCS Summer Simulation Conference at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in downtown Houston, Texas. I gave my first scientific presentation, and my visit to Houston was also my very first trip to the U.S. I was very young, and the trip left a deep impression with me.
Jay Forrester was the luncheon speaker at the event. He talked about his world model.
As I mentioned in my comment above, I had by then played around quite a bit with his model. One thing that I had done was to place a negative sign in front of every one of the five state equations, thereby simulating the model backward through time starting in 1900. It turned out that almost immediately, the population started climbing, and we know that this never happened.
Hence after the presentation was over and the audience was asked whether they had any questions for Jay, I raised my hand and told him about what I had done, asking for his reaction.
His reaction was very swift. His face turned red, and he told me (and everyone else in the room): "Young man, my book has sold 65 million copies, it has been translated into 25 languages, and that should be answer enough for you."
I remember his reaction verbatim to this day ( :-) ).
Hi Francois,
Can you quote said equations, please, or post a link? And maybe quote your modified versions?
I'm sure they're not just physical laws, but a lot of physics (mostly irreversible thermo) fails or blows up if you reverse the flow of time.
Cheers,
PUD
Hi PUD:
State equations are those equations that determine the "levels" (or "stocks"). They are differential equations. For example, we can write:
dPOP/dt = BR - DR
i.e., the change in population equals the birth rate minus the death rate.
Forrester's WORLD2 model contains five "levels": population, pollution, natural resources, capital investment, and percentage of capital investment in the agricultural sector (a funny choice of a state variable).
If you negate every one of the state equations, e.g.:
dPOP/dt = -(BR - DR)
you obtain (at least theoretically) the same trajectories as before, but now you are simulating backward through time.
You are correct with your assessment that the model is unstable when simulated backward through time. When I simulate the WORLD2 model backward through time without any further consideration using DASSL as a numerical ODE solver, I can simulate the model acro