Great post... but, this is not a prime example of westtexas export land model because the economy is not booming and consumption is not increasing. It is, of course, another example of declining production forcing an exporter to convert to an importer, somewhat similar to another island(s) nation, Indonesia. Mexico looks to be next, maybe by 2010.
The problem with the "export land" model is that it assumes that oil will be preferentially diverted to domestic consumption. This is highly unlikely in western, market driven economies like England, Norway, Canada and other exporters. Their domestic populations will be subject to the same prices as international customers and will grow or moderate their consumption to the same degree as the rest of the world.
It also does not seem particularly likely in undemocratic countries, because the rulers of those countries are primarily interested in one thing: cash. They will send their domestic oil to where it earns the most money, and in general that will be the international market.
Of course it is automatically true that a country's exports equal is production minus its internal consumption (neglecting any imports). The test of "export land" is whether the per capita consumption of major oil exporters is increasing significantly faster than other comparably wealthy countries around the world.
Sure; the UK and Norway don't exhibit the "export land" model of rapid growth based on preferential pricing because
they are mature economies, with fairly low energy consumption per unit of GDP anyway, and
their prevailing ideology does not lend itself to protectionist economic policy.
But it's easy enough to demonstrate the truth of the model on a case by case basis with the major oil exporters (Russia, Saudi, Venezuela, etc...) where oil-product prices are indeed subsidised in order to promote economic growth.
I'm not saying this is smart policy, but it's clear that it's happening.
Norway is a separate case I think, (it doesn't consume enough oil to make much difference, and never will-- population is not growing by much, the country's geography is about concentrated pockets of population along the coastline).
Canada is bound by NAFTA treaty to supply the US on an equal basis to Canada-- the oil flows south from Alberta, not East to Toronto (largely: there are still some refineries in Sarnia, Ontario, near Detroit). Quebec and the Maritime Provinces import their oil.
The UK is, AFAIK, similarly bound to supply oil on equal terms to its EU trading partners, although in practice in 1973 and the oil embargo it was 'every man for himself'. But the price will be set by outside world prices-- no one imagines a UK government would be stupid enough to try to control the domestic price of oil.
I agree with you in general, but want to add one qualifier. There is one thing autocratic regimes like more than cash, and that is staying in power.
Iraq had an enormous fuel subsidy when Saddam was still in power. That is changing now, and people are pissed off about it. In short, the rulers have to balance the desire for cash with the need to quell popular unrest, which threatens their regime.
A couple of scenarios are possible:
despots in exporting countries will tolerate declining exports (rising internal consumption) since the declining oil remaining for export will push up oil prices enough to satisfy their greed.
The need for cash will get the upper hand and they will back off on subsidies and try to control or suppress public unrest. This reaction would maintain the amount of oil available for export, or at least it wouldn't drop as fast as the Export Land model would predict
Which one should we expect? It obviously depends on what country you are talking about, the severity of any popular backlash to rising oil prices, and a million other factors. In short, it's anybody's guess.
Even when domestic consumption is unsubsidized the surge of cash into an oil exporting country due to higher prices will lead to more consumption. Since practically all consumption has an oil component this means an increase in oil consumption.
Demand destruction is going to occur primarily in the economies that do not benefit from higher energy prices because there will be a massive transfer of wealth from the importers to the exporters. However this only looks at it from a national perspective. The average Canadian is going to be hurting in the wallet just as much as an average Amererican. The big winners are going to be the oil companies and associated industries, their employees, their stock holders and the (Alberta) government.
While you raise some good points what evidence do you have to make the following statement?
"They will send their domestic oil to where it earns the most money, and in general that will be the international market" Does this really depend on the relative purchasing power of the domestic consumer (per capita GDP?)
Secondly exports and imports of oil will also be detrmined by the quality of the oil. Eg In Australia the oil is very light despite declining production much is exported as it is too light to refine into heavier products. So oil such as Tapis and Arab Crude is imported to make gas, diesel and bitumen products.
Thirdly there are long term contracts. Not everything is sold on the spot market to the highest bidder. They may well have to honour these contracts first they may be domestic customers on the other hand they could be export cutomers.
Fourthly distance from markets affects where crude is sourced and where it is sold. For example there are places in the world that it does not make sense to ship oil half way around the world when a local source is close at hand. Consumers rely on more local producers as transport costs impact on input cost.
Fifthly - there is the I hate President Bush Factor. For example Chavez is making contracts with China to ship oil halfway around the world because he hates Bush. Do not discount such factors as the major fields collapse. These little countries have been pushed around too much and sense the weakness by america's dependance on imported oil.
Fifthly - there is the I hate President Bush Factor. For example Chavez is making contracts with China to ship oil halfway around the world because he hates Bush. Do not discount such factors as the major fields collapse. These little countries have been pushed around too much and sense the weakness by america's dependance on imported oil.
And the theory passes that test with flying colours. Just look at the BP oil consumption data.
As for your blanket generalisations about democracy, they are foolish.
An oil exporting country will be enjoying positive trade balance and a strong currency as a consequence. The result is that for the domestic consumption oil will remain relatively cheap even though the price may be rising for the oil importing countries.
The same thing is happening now with the US. Oil is realtively expensive for the US residents, but it is hardly felt outside of the US, because of the weakening dollar.
We don't need to look at all countries to analyse the oil export market, but rather mainly Saudi Arabia and Russia which total 41.4% of total world oil exports (SA at 8.7 mbd and Russia at 6.7 mbd exported). Norway is a distant third at 2.9 mbd exported. According to 2004 EIA data.
What is interesting in this article is that it shows exports decline (in the UK example) at consumption increase - production increase. Actually I suppose somewhat obvious.
Saudi Arabia's oil consumption increased by 11% in 2005 -- due to strong economic growth (+6.3%), a growing appitite for SUV's (SUV's are the most popular car in the middle east) and a growing petrochemical complex, and population growth (2.18%). So unless oil production increases 11% then oil exports will decline in the 11% range.
Russia's oil consumption increased 7% in 2005 driven by economic growth (6.0%) and increases in energy usage due to cold weather, and increases in car sales from very low levels.
So looking at the main exporters we are facing about 9% declines in oil exported unless Saudi and Russia slow dramatically and/or alter consumption behavior, or increase production, both of which appear unlikely. Without oil exported there is no secondary market for oil.
Saudi Arabia's oil consumption increased by 11% in 2005 -- due to strong economic growth (+6.3%), a growing appitite for SUV's (SUV's are the most popular car in the middle east) and a growing petrochemical complex, and population growth (2.18%). So unless oil production increases 11% then oil exports will decline in the 11% range.
Note that Saudi production is down, through 6/06, by 5.2% from last year's level (EIA, crude + condensate). So, as predicted, net oil exports being squeezed from two directions--by falling production and by rising consumption.
While Saudi Arabia has 26 million people (5 million of them are guest workers) the very high birth rate means that 40% or so of the population are under 15 so they will not use much oil.
No, what that means is that a very high proportion of the population turns 18 in a given year, and gets a car for their birthday.
The Saudi birthrate is surely an anomaly in terms of classic income-per-capita demographics. It's a rather extreme illustration of the fact that demographic transition is mostly about the emancipation of women.
Income per capita has roughly fallen by 2/3rds since 1974 in Saudi Arabia (population has tripled, the real price of oil is no higher, there hasn't been enough other industry come in to fill the gap).
Saudi Arabia is also dependent on 'shadow water' (the term used to mean the water imported as part of food and other products)- -it doesn't have enough of its own resources.
The country is on the edge of very serious political and social trouble. The combination of widespread religious radicalism, a corrupt ruling class, the absence of any meaningful democracy, and poor prospects for the huge majority of the population under 21 is a lethal cocktail-- precisely what led to Algeria's civil war for example.
Right now, the current high price of oil (and high production) and the ruthlessness of the state security apparatus keeps the lid on. But there is no question the Royal Family has been shocked by the various terrorist attacks, and the incompetence of the Security Forces at defeating them. The security forces themselves are rumoured to be riddled with Islamicist sympathisers.
Whilst Abdhullah remains alive and in power, I don't expect change. He is seen as an honest man, and not personally corrupt. When some of his cousins get to power, the situation may be very different.
Osama bin Ladin may yet see the day when he is welcomed in his homeland as a hero.
India 2004 oil consumption 2,573,000 bpd
India 2005 oil consumption 2,485,000 bpd
One of the developing economies to show a fall in consuption last year. Note that France, Germany and Italy also show falls in crude oil consumption - in part related to de-indutrialisation, but maybe also through introduction of "alternatives"?
Yes, rapid economic growth and slowing oil consumption. I see this as the counter trend to the Export Land Model: Delinking Land. As exports slow, countries will do more with less.
The thing which strikes me from the decline in German oil use is how consistent it is - that is, the delayed impact of price can certainly be seen in the 'spike' around 2001, but in general, Germany has been attempting to reduce oil use.
When you think about it, the easiest answers tend to be the same ones which make Germany the world's largest exporter - a tight focus on efficiency, a hard headed view of costs, and an awareness of the entire cycle of production, from acquiring raw materials to disposing of the waste at the end.
Oil costs Germany money, whereas wind turbines, for example, are planned as a future export product - and with a fully electric rail transport system, it is possible to substitute long haul trucking with rail, using renewable sources such as hydro, wind, solar - to a major extent, this is seen as an engineering problem, something Germans tend to feel very comfortable in dealing with. Not that Germans are blind believers in technology like Americans - merely that Germans believe technical problems can be solved with technical solutions - for example, if solar is only available during the day, then the freight train schedule will simply have to reflect that fact - in American eyes, that is not a solution, it is a failure.
And Germany has been quite rigorous in creating a bio-diesel framework for trucks and farm tractors. At this point, easily 50% of the long haul trucks seem to be using bio-diesel, from the smell they leave behind.
Germans have known that oil is a finite resource for more than a generation, which is one reason peak oil as handled here is not really a major theme, while consistent effots to conserve through higher efficiency and reduced use are seen as a necessity, not something which can be put off until the future.
So now all the Germans have to do is put speed limits on their Autobahns. I think you use something like 3 times as much fuel driving at 200 km/h compared to 100 km/h.
I have read that approximately 97% of the Autobahn has speed limits.
But living between Frankfurt and Stuttgart, more or less along the flat and straight A5, which part of the direct route between Frankfurt Airport and the headquarters of Porsche and Mercedes, I expect this stretch of the autobahn to be one of the last unlimited speed routes in the world. Marketing is critical to selling overpriced vehicles.
Speaking very generally, trucks are only allowed 80 kph (50 mph) and up to maybe 90 kph is tolerated - 100kph is not. And those trucks are increasingly using bio-diesel.
This is not a defense of high speed driving - it is that simply the image of the autobahns is not really the same as the daily reality - most cars driven here are not even capable of 200 kph. But those that can go fast are often driven as fast as they can go - which certainly stands out for those not used to driving in such conditions.
After returning from the U.S., I would guess that the average speed of all traffic (not counting heavy rush hour) is at least as high as in Germany, mainly because of all the trucks doing 80 mph (130 kph).
I don't know what part of the US you went to, here on the west coast we rarely seen any truck do over 65 mph. Most often 60. Washington state in particular has very good policing of the interstate.
I have noticed lately more trucks driving slower (55mph). I assume on orders to save fuel by the bosses.
What is particularly sobering about this post is the long line of double digit decline numbers. One might have been lead to believe by splitting the difference between doomers and cornucopians that decline rates would be much more modest; or, as per ASPO, an overall 2 or 3% decline for an entire province.
It appears Schlumberger's "8%" decline rate is indeed a fact, and perhaps a very conservative one.
If Saudi Arabia and Kuwait follows this trajectory, you'd better be buckled in for a wild ride!
* * *
By the way, WestTexas, is SA production down 5.2%, or is that the decline rate for their Exports?
"By the way, WestTexas, is SA production down 5.2%, or is that the decline rate for their Exports?"
Based on EIA crude + condensate, highest KSA number last year was 9.6 mbpd. 6/06 was 9.1. 12/05 was 9.5 (9.6 to 9.1 is down 5.2%). Some Saudi ministers suggest about 9.0 for August, some suggest 9.2 range.
The annual production decline rate, based on 12/05 to 6/06, was 8.3%.
Based on the 12/05 to 6/06 EIA data, the top 10 net oil exporters, based on estimated consumption, showed about a 9.2% annual decline rate in net oil exports.
You can't use Crude+condensate for production when calculating exports. You have to use all liquids, since consumption is also measured in all liquids.
I used a "fudge factor" for consumption. I assumed that 2006 crude + condensate consumption was about the same as 2004 total liquids consumption, based on the rate of growth in consumption.
The secondary oil market is already most likely in decline -- at a faster rate than total world oil production. The level of world oil production is debated but there should be almost no debate concerning the level of exportable oil. This isn't getting enough coverage.
Any models of oil production should take into account that only exportable oil is traded. There is no way exportable oil is going up with Saudi Arabia and Russia growing like they are. I don't think anyone can pound the table hard enough on this point.
It went up between 2004 and 2005. That's for sure. I used real numbers instead of the estimates you have been using. I used your 11% and 7% consumption increase numbers for SA and Russia to save time. I don't know where you got those numbers. They don't match the trend of the previous 3 years and there is nothing to suggest they will continue if they are true.
A quick calculation using average monthly all liquids production 2004->2005 shows a SA and Russian combined net exports increase of 364,000 bpd.
So yes, there is a way, and you can stop pounding the table.
The 7% number for Russia was estimated by the EIA country studies data on domestic oil consumption for Russia in 2003 (last year historical) and the number for estimated 2004 (first forecasted year). This number actually comes out to 8.65%. I apologize for writing that this was for 2005 -- I wrote the comment up there quickly. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Oil.html
Same method for Saudi Arabia: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html#oil However the EIA only presents Saudi domestic oil consumption in a graphical format. Therefore you have to eyeball the numbers and make a calculation of growth.
I wish I could delete the above comment -- Oil CEO is closer to right on historical. The EIA shows 3% for Russian consumption in the last historical year available (2002 to 2003) at about 3% higher, then forcasts through 2005 with essentially no growth in oil consumption (don't know why?). I transposed some numbers in my calculation -- this data I compiled a while ago.
Saudi is closer to 4% from 00 to 04 according to the EIA data in the EIA.
Using BP's more tame 4.5% and 1.7% consumption increases, you can probably tack on another 200,000 barrels of exported oil from these two countries, bringing the total increase in 2005 to over 500,000 barrels per day.
Yes, but...
How about trying to extrapolate to first half 06? Use bp data for consumption, assum this continues as in 05, then look at published first half production...
with SA down, even with russia up, my guess is that exports are probably flat at best, but maybe down.
It also does not seem particularly likely in undemocratic countries, because the rulers of those countries are primarily interested in one thing: cash. They will send their domestic oil to where it earns the most money, and in general that will be the international market.
Of course it is automatically true that a country's exports equal is production minus its internal consumption (neglecting any imports). The test of "export land" is whether the per capita consumption of major oil exporters is increasing significantly faster than other comparably wealthy countries around the world.
- they are mature economies, with fairly low energy consumption per unit of GDP anyway, and
- their prevailing ideology does not lend itself to protectionist economic policy.
But it's easy enough to demonstrate the truth of the model on a case by case basis with the major oil exporters (Russia, Saudi, Venezuela, etc...) where oil-product prices are indeed subsidised in order to promote economic growth.I'm not saying this is smart policy, but it's clear that it's happening.
Canada is bound by NAFTA treaty to supply the US on an equal basis to Canada-- the oil flows south from Alberta, not East to Toronto (largely: there are still some refineries in Sarnia, Ontario, near Detroit). Quebec and the Maritime Provinces import their oil.
The UK is, AFAIK, similarly bound to supply oil on equal terms to its EU trading partners, although in practice in 1973 and the oil embargo it was 'every man for himself'. But the price will be set by outside world prices-- no one imagines a UK government would be stupid enough to try to control the domestic price of oil.
PS
Interesting to learn that a plan to seize the Gulf Oil assets was going round Washington and Whitehall in 1973:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3333995.stm
I agree with you in general, but want to add one qualifier. There is one thing autocratic regimes like more than cash, and that is staying in power.
Iraq had an enormous fuel subsidy when Saddam was still in power. That is changing now, and people are pissed off about it. In short, the rulers have to balance the desire for cash with the need to quell popular unrest, which threatens their regime.
A couple of scenarios are possible:
- despots in exporting countries will tolerate declining exports (rising internal consumption) since the declining oil remaining for export will push up oil prices enough to satisfy their greed.
- The need for cash will get the upper hand and they will back off on subsidies and try to control or suppress public unrest. This reaction would maintain the amount of oil available for export, or at least it wouldn't drop as fast as the Export Land model would predict
Which one should we expect? It obviously depends on what country you are talking about, the severity of any popular backlash to rising oil prices, and a million other factors. In short, it's anybody's guess.Demand destruction is going to occur primarily in the economies that do not benefit from higher energy prices because there will be a massive transfer of wealth from the importers to the exporters. However this only looks at it from a national perspective. The average Canadian is going to be hurting in the wallet just as much as an average Amererican. The big winners are going to be the oil companies and associated industries, their employees, their stock holders and the (Alberta) government.
While you raise some good points what evidence do you have to make the following statement?
"They will send their domestic oil to where it earns the most money, and in general that will be the international market" Does this really depend on the relative purchasing power of the domestic consumer (per capita GDP?)
Secondly exports and imports of oil will also be detrmined by the quality of the oil. Eg In Australia the oil is very light despite declining production much is exported as it is too light to refine into heavier products. So oil such as Tapis and Arab Crude is imported to make gas, diesel and bitumen products.
Thirdly there are long term contracts. Not everything is sold on the spot market to the highest bidder. They may well have to honour these contracts first they may be domestic customers on the other hand they could be export cutomers.
Fourthly distance from markets affects where crude is sourced and where it is sold. For example there are places in the world that it does not make sense to ship oil half way around the world when a local source is close at hand. Consumers rely on more local producers as transport costs impact on input cost.
As for your blanket generalisations about democracy, they are foolish.
An oil exporting country will be enjoying positive trade balance and a strong currency as a consequence. The result is that for the domestic consumption oil will remain relatively cheap even though the price may be rising for the oil importing countries.
The same thing is happening now with the US. Oil is realtively expensive for the US residents, but it is hardly felt outside of the US, because of the weakening dollar.
What is interesting in this article is that it shows exports decline (in the UK example) at consumption increase - production increase. Actually I suppose somewhat obvious.
Saudi Arabia's oil consumption increased by 11% in 2005 -- due to strong economic growth (+6.3%), a growing appitite for SUV's (SUV's are the most popular car in the middle east) and a growing petrochemical complex, and population growth (2.18%). So unless oil production increases 11% then oil exports will decline in the 11% range.
Russia's oil consumption increased 7% in 2005 driven by economic growth (6.0%) and increases in energy usage due to cold weather, and increases in car sales from very low levels.
So looking at the main exporters we are facing about 9% declines in oil exported unless Saudi and Russia slow dramatically and/or alter consumption behavior, or increase production, both of which appear unlikely. Without oil exported there is no secondary market for oil.
Note that Saudi production is down, through 6/06, by 5.2% from last year's level (EIA, crude + condensate). So, as predicted, net oil exports being squeezed from two directions--by falling production and by rising consumption.
- Saudi production down, consumption up, therefore exports way down
- China imports way up (15%?)
- world production flat
- no apparent shortage of oil on the market.
So there is, necessarily, major demand destruction going on. Where? Africa, India? Are the numbers emerging?Saudi Arabia has 20 million people, and GDP per head of c. $8,000.
US consumes 25 bl per person pa, I would bet the Saudis don't consume a quarter of that per person.
Figure 12 bl/per person/ per annum in Saudi: that equates to 240m bl pa or about 600,000 bl/day so less than 10% of total production.
The picture might be a bit more blurry than that because the domestic petrochemical industry soaks up crude (but exports refined products).
The Saudi birthrate is surely an anomaly in terms of classic income-per-capita demographics. It's a rather extreme illustration of the fact that demographic transition is mostly about the emancipation of women.
Income per capita has roughly fallen by 2/3rds since 1974 in Saudi Arabia (population has tripled, the real price of oil is no higher, there hasn't been enough other industry come in to fill the gap).
Saudi Arabia is also dependent on 'shadow water' (the term used to mean the water imported as part of food and other products)- -it doesn't have enough of its own resources.
The country is on the edge of very serious political and social trouble. The combination of widespread religious radicalism, a corrupt ruling class, the absence of any meaningful democracy, and poor prospects for the huge majority of the population under 21 is a lethal cocktail-- precisely what led to Algeria's civil war for example.
Right now, the current high price of oil (and high production) and the ruthlessness of the state security apparatus keeps the lid on. But there is no question the Royal Family has been shocked by the various terrorist attacks, and the incompetence of the Security Forces at defeating them. The security forces themselves are rumoured to be riddled with Islamicist sympathisers.
Whilst Abdhullah remains alive and in power, I don't expect change. He is seen as an honest man, and not personally corrupt. When some of his cousins get to power, the situation may be very different.
Osama bin Ladin may yet see the day when he is welcomed in his homeland as a hero.
India 2004 oil consumption 2,573,000 bpd
India 2005 oil consumption 2,485,000 bpd
One of the developing economies to show a fall in consuption last year. Note that France, Germany and Italy also show falls in crude oil consumption - in part related to de-indutrialisation, but maybe also through introduction of "alternatives"?
When you think about it, the easiest answers tend to be the same ones which make Germany the world's largest exporter - a tight focus on efficiency, a hard headed view of costs, and an awareness of the entire cycle of production, from acquiring raw materials to disposing of the waste at the end.
Oil costs Germany money, whereas wind turbines, for example, are planned as a future export product - and with a fully electric rail transport system, it is possible to substitute long haul trucking with rail, using renewable sources such as hydro, wind, solar - to a major extent, this is seen as an engineering problem, something Germans tend to feel very comfortable in dealing with. Not that Germans are blind believers in technology like Americans - merely that Germans believe technical problems can be solved with technical solutions - for example, if solar is only available during the day, then the freight train schedule will simply have to reflect that fact - in American eyes, that is not a solution, it is a failure.
And Germany has been quite rigorous in creating a bio-diesel framework for trucks and farm tractors. At this point, easily 50% of the long haul trucks seem to be using bio-diesel, from the smell they leave behind.
Germans have known that oil is a finite resource for more than a generation, which is one reason peak oil as handled here is not really a major theme, while consistent effots to conserve through higher efficiency and reduced use are seen as a necessity, not something which can be put off until the future.
But living between Frankfurt and Stuttgart, more or less along the flat and straight A5, which part of the direct route between Frankfurt Airport and the headquarters of Porsche and Mercedes, I expect this stretch of the autobahn to be one of the last unlimited speed routes in the world. Marketing is critical to selling overpriced vehicles.
Speaking very generally, trucks are only allowed 80 kph (50 mph) and up to maybe 90 kph is tolerated - 100kph is not. And those trucks are increasingly using bio-diesel.
This is not a defense of high speed driving - it is that simply the image of the autobahns is not really the same as the daily reality - most cars driven here are not even capable of 200 kph. But those that can go fast are often driven as fast as they can go - which certainly stands out for those not used to driving in such conditions.
After returning from the U.S., I would guess that the average speed of all traffic (not counting heavy rush hour) is at least as high as in Germany, mainly because of all the trucks doing 80 mph (130 kph).
I have noticed lately more trucks driving slower (55mph). I assume on orders to save fuel by the bosses.
It appears Schlumberger's "8%" decline rate is indeed a fact, and perhaps a very conservative one.
If Saudi Arabia and Kuwait follows this trajectory, you'd better be buckled in for a wild ride!
* * *
By the way, WestTexas, is SA production down 5.2%, or is that the decline rate for their Exports?
Based on EIA crude + condensate, highest KSA number last year was 9.6 mbpd. 6/06 was 9.1. 12/05 was 9.5 (9.6 to 9.1 is down 5.2%). Some Saudi ministers suggest about 9.0 for August, some suggest 9.2 range.
The annual production decline rate, based on 12/05 to 6/06, was 8.3%.
Based on the 12/05 to 6/06 EIA data, the top 10 net oil exporters, based on estimated consumption, showed about a 9.2% annual decline rate in net oil exports.
Any models of oil production should take into account that only exportable oil is traded. There is no way exportable oil is going up with Saudi Arabia and Russia growing like they are. I don't think anyone can pound the table hard enough on this point.
A quick calculation using average monthly all liquids production 2004->2005 shows a SA and Russian combined net exports increase of 364,000 bpd.
So yes, there is a way, and you can stop pounding the table.
Same method for Saudi Arabia: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html#oil However the EIA only presents Saudi domestic oil consumption in a graphical format. Therefore you have to eyeball the numbers and make a calculation of growth.
Saudi is closer to 4% from 00 to 04 according to the EIA data in the EIA.
How about trying to extrapolate to first half 06? Use bp data for consumption, assum this continues as in 05, then look at published first half production...
with SA down, even with russia up, my guess is that exports are probably flat at best, but maybe down.